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Introduction 
The experience of the Third Reich and Stalinist Soviet Union in 20th century Europe 
presents multi-sided social, moral and political issues. Looking back at the regimes, the 
experiences of the people who lived through them, and the numerous highly troubling 
realizations about what people are capable of offers ample food for thought: German-Jewish 
political thinker Hannah Arendt has highlighted the unsettling and unprecedented nature of 
totalitarian regimes. The bureaucracy-bound mechanisms of normalizing violence and harm 
influenced every aspect of the society; the isolation and fear that totalitarian governments 
planted in the society in general reached its peak and full realization in the concentration, 
extermination and forced labor camps.   
There is a myriad of literary texts written about the experience of Gulag forced labor 
camps and Nazi concentration camps, in genres ranging from memoirs and autobiography 
to fiction, covering a variety of works that reside between accounts of what one remembers 
to have experienced, and imaginative narration. Many of the novels and short stories written 
by Estonian writer Jaan Kross are placed somewhere between memories and fiction, telling 
fictive stories about the narrator Peeter Mirk’s (Kross’s alter ego) experiences in Estonia 
during Soviet and Nazi occupation, as well as his life in Gulag forced labor camps in North-
Russia during the Soviet occupation.  
This thesis brings together the views of Arendt with those of American 20th century neo-
pragmatist philosopher Richard Rorty, and undertakes the task of offering a philosophical 
reading of Jaan Kross’s Gulag stories with the help of a synthesis of Arendt’s and Rorty’s 
key ideas. The synthesis of their ideas is going to be addressed in a separate subchapter, 
where we present a philosophical framework for reading concentration camp literature. This 
framework joins Arendt’s and Rorty’s views on evil and cruelty, elimination of spontaneity 
and unmaking someone’s world, highlighting the concern about language and freedom of 
narrativity as the connecting element in their works. 
We show that Arendt’s reflections on the social mechanisms of totalitarianism, and 
especially her discussion on the manifold destruction (with its meaninglessness and 
surreality) of human beings can be connected to and reconciled with Rorty’s ideas: Rorty’s 
views about truth, politics, and morality have often been considered controversial and 
contentious. Hence, the task is clearly a non-trivial one: why include Rorty, when his 
philosophical works do not have a place in the canon of discussing totalitarianism? Rorty is 
an attractive choice for writing about the topic at hand for the reason that his figure of the 
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liberal ironist enables us to speak about (the importance of) solidarity and moral concerns 
without a ‘religious’ edge: without grounding moral judgments in human nature, appealing 
to an unchanging core-self, or search for objective truth and absolutes.   
The central question of the thesis, from which Arendt’s and Rorty’s conversation 
emerges, is concerned with making moral choices in difficult conditions: facing moral 
choices in a forced labor camp, what options remain? How could we interpret those choices 
in the context of the camp life – i.e., what does it mean to choose the way Kross’s characters 
do? With that, we are addressing the question: if a character makes a moral choice, what 
does this choice mean from the perspective of, firstly, their chances for surviving1, and 
secondly, their prospect of resistance? Based on our reading of Kross’s stories, we introduce 
a concept of playfulness (mänglevus in Estonian). The playfulness that we emphasize is a 
moral choice that defies the destructivity of the camps and functions as a self-constructive 
force. It enables one to stay spontaneous and redescribe, thus upholding the very freedom of 
narrativity – the freedom to weave coherent stories about oneself and the world – in the camp 
inmates. 
The first chapter asks what kind of conclusions could be made from reading Kross’s 
fiction: the aim of this chapter is to draw the boundaries of the argument that the thesis 
makes, by showing Kross as a good choice for discussing the ‘limbo’ area of the camps, but 
does not allow us to discuss the harshest of the camp conditions. As the forced labor camps 
had milder living conditions than the death camps (of which Arendt has written at length, 
for example), they are a suitable setting for looking at moral choices: the stakes are high 
enough due to the destruction that still looms on the horizon, as we know from the writings 
of Varlam Shalamov; at the same time, life in a forced labor camp still leaves room for 
vocabularies and moral dilemmas. In this chapter, we also address the genre of the thesis by 
outlining some of the principles according to which philosophical analysis of literary works 
is conducted in this thesis. 
The second chapter focuses on the synthesis of Arendt and Rorty. The chapter first 
introduces Arendt’s political philosophy and then, in the second subchapter, some of Rorty’s 
ideas. The chapter highlights the aspects of their approaches that are relevant for our analysis 
of playfulness as a form of resistance that employs redescription and spontaneity, i.e. the 
                                                 
1 The word “survive” has a twofold meaning in this thesis. The first meaning is perhaps the most commonly 
understood one: surviving means staying physically alive. The second meaning stems from the particular 
context of the camps, where the term “living corpses” indicates that people die, in some sense, already before 
they physically perish; survival, then, would mean staying mentally and emotionally alive (and hence also 
maintaining the moral faculty, the ability to make moral decisions). 
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meaning and consequences of complete destruction of a person, and spontaneity as a 
phenomenon that goes hand in hand with staying alive inside, and the importance of 
redescription amidst destruction. In the third section of the chapter, we present a 
philosophical framework for reading Kross, which emerges from merging Arendt’s and 
Rorty’s conceptual toolboxes and approaches. This part focuses on the narrative nature of 
human beings as it is outlined and (even though sometimes tacitly) emphasized by both 
Rorty and Arendt – the need to make sense of oneself as well as one’s surroundings.  
In the third chapter, this philosophical framework (as well as our knowledge about 
Arendt’s and Rorty’s approaches to the destruction and unmaking a person’s world) is 
applied in interpreting the moral choices of Basile and Dr Ulrich in Kross’s “Vürst” (“The 
Prince”) and “Halleluuja” (“Hallelujah”) (Kross 2004). These two stories have the figure of 
an eccentric – a misfit in the camp lifestyle – in their center. Even though they are very 
different, both Basile and Dr Ulrich were the masters of their redescription of the self 
(without adopting the ‘camp-redescription’ of themselves, a term I introduce in the first 
chapter) and realized spontaneity via their playfulness and quest for originality, thus resisting 
the camp script that, together with accumulating sufferings, slowly took inmates towards 
less and less possibilities of forming coherent narratives. The playfulness that we discuss is 
a very particular kind of playfulness; a great part of the chapter is dedicated to outlining its 
characteristics and nature, which also helps us distinguish Basile’s and Dr Ulrich’s 
game/playfulness from a cruel game. 
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1 Kross and the ‘limbo’ of the camp experience 
In this chapter, we will place Kross’s works alongside those of Auschwitz and Gulag 
survivors, Primo Levi and Varlam Shalamov. Kross’s stories differ from the works of Levi 
and Shalamov in important ways. Addressing those differences will help us understand the 
relevance of Kross’s stories for this thesis, as well as to draw the boundaries of the area of 
interest that Kross’s texts illuminate the best. Given that this chapter is concerned with the 
choice of Kross as such, the question of the genre of the thesis – philosophical analysis of 
literary works – shall also be addressed, in order to outline some of the principles according 
to which the analysis is conducted.  
Levi’s and Shalamov’s accounts of their survival could be considered some of the most 
well-known and classic literary texts written about personal encounters with a violent state 
apparatus (the experience of camps in Nazi Germany and Stalinist Soviet Union). A brief 
mapping of the experiences and stories of Kross, Levi, and Shalamov will help us answer 
the following questions: why are Kross’s works important for understanding the moral 
dilemmas that arise in totalitarian societies when individuals encounter the violent state 
apparatus? How realistic are his works in depicting such encounters and issues? Thus, this 
chapter is an essential building block for the whole project at hand, as it defines the scope 
(and limitations) of the conclusions that could be drawn after a close reading of Kross.  
1.1 Building bridges between philosophy and literature 
To understand the boundaries of the thesis and what kind of conclusions can be made, 
we should look further from Kross and turn our attention to the approach that is taken in this 
thesis: bringing together philosophy and literature. In case of a philosophical interpretation 
of fiction, the examples that are drawn from literature are treated differently than the 
examples that occur, for example, in thought experiments; as Peter Singer wrote in The 
Moral of the Story: An Anthology of Ethics Through Literature: “Hence philosophical 
examples in ethics usually lack depth, the characters in them are mere ciphers, and the 
context is absent or at best, briefly sketched. Sometimes we are asked to imagine things that 
are, in practical terms, impossible, or wildly implausible.” (Singer and Singer 2005, x) The 
goal of creating bridges between philosophy and literature is to enable an analysis that 
benefits both from the richness of context, historical background, and realistic, life-like 
characters and situations that are embedded in the time and place that the plot dictates, i.e. 
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in their historical setting, as well as the argumentative precision, nuance and freedom that 
philosophy encourages and enables.  
Due to their compact, concise, and purpose-bound nature, philosophical thought 
experiments do not offer this richness of context and embeddedness of the agent. However, 
philosophy is important for the task at hand, as well, although in different aspects: with the 
help of philosophy, we can draw more general, technical, and/or precise conclusions due to 
the lack of constraints that an aesthetic narrative poses. For example, if a novel about life in 
a totalitarian system went into very much detail about how and why the regime came to be, 
and described the socio-political dynamics that led up to the regime with the same detail and 
precision of political-theoretical nuances as a treatise on political theory, it might lose a 
considerable part of its aesthetic nature (its flow, for example). Hence, as the phrase “bring 
together” indicates, neither philosophy nor the literature should be stripped of their character 
and particular advantages.  
In the case of literature, this means maintaining the richness, character building, and 
integrity of the text we are dealing with. The text’s richness manifests itself in the language 
use: the vocabulary, metaphors, and style of detail depiction enable us to imagine the life-
world that the characters inhabit; the writing style, including the choice of what is told, 
emphasized, and left untold, also guides the reader’s experience and mingles with it in 
complex ways. The reader perceives the place, time, lifestyle and values that the characters 
live in and possess via the linguistic devices that the author employed. Character building is 
also related to the richness of the text and the literary techniques which give the reader access 
to the setting of a story. In fiction as well as in literary analysis, characters are not reduced 
to mere ciphers whose behavior serves as a sketch of an action or decision that is relevant 
for some theoretical purposes; instead, we take Rorty’s view and treat them as embodiments 
of possibilities that the variety and plurality of different societies (could) hold in themselves, 
some more, some less realistic. They can bring us a view of what a certain possible future is 
like, or be part of a specific description of the past. As illustrators of possibilities, the 
characters are just as alive (and often just dangerous, reconciliatory or reassuring) as the 
people we meet outside of books. Characters have their past, more and less complex 
psychological construction, and certain outlooks – horizons that border their experiences and 
perspectives to life – which are integral to understanding their choices. 
This leads us to integrity – a literary text should be treated as a whole, since the narrative 
into which the characters are set creates a context for understanding them. Regardless of 
whether a character’s motivations, desires, and background unfold to the reader at once, as 
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is often the case in more compact and concise genres, as the short story, or gradually, perhaps 
even over several stories/books by the same author, literary texts derive their power from 
how the parts come together as a whole. However, when integrating literary texts into 
philosophical analysis, it is easier to maintain the integrity of shorter, more concise genres 
like the short story. The short story is simply more easily graspable as a whole, and is 
therefore especially apt for philosophical interpretation. 
With regard to creating bridges between literature and philosophy, we face the question 
about the challenges that come with creating such bridges. It is important that philosophical 
analysis of literary works may face the danger of cherry-picking: with a certain philosophical 
question in mind, one can look at a text and, with the help of enough interpretation, see the 
text as an answer to the question; this is especially relevant if the text itself does not mention 
or discuss the question (or any philosophical question, for that matter). Here, we can see the 
importance of the fictive text’s integrity for a philosophical interpretation of literature – the 
less the (parts of the) text is treated as a skeleton of context-independent logical 
constructions, useful for confirming an already existing idea, the smaller the chances of 
cherry-picking.  
Hence, philosophical analysis of literary works should be sensitive to contradictions 
between the text (from beginning to end) and the interpretation. The problem is less current 
if the text offers a point of connection for analysis by already asking philosophical questions. 
This is the case with Kross’s stories, as they reflect on problems of morality, dignity, identity, 
and responsibility, and individuals’ encounters with violent political power. The narrator of 
many of Kross’s texts, Peeter Mirk, is a thoughtful character, which enables us to draw on 
his reflections about what one can and should do as an inmate of a forced labor camp, what 
one ought to do in a newly occupied country where the threat of being arrested is constantly 
hanging above one’s head, and whether (and why) it can be a good decision to be playful 
with the power structures.  
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1.2 Themes of destruction in Shalamov’s and Levi’s writings 
For the task at hand, Kross is an interesting choice for a number of reasons. As he had 
experienced both regimes and encountered both the stress of being arrested by the Germans 
and the deportation to Vorkuta by Soviet authorities, a Gulag camp in North-Russia (Kross 
spent eight years in this part of Russia before his return), his stories reflect his own 
experiences. The personal nature of his depictions of the characters’ encounters with the 
power apparatus and the difficult conditions in the camps is evident. However, the stories 
themselves are a mixture of fictive events and characters, the events that actually took place, 
and the people Kross actually met. In this sense, his stories about camp experiences form a 
body of historical novels and short stories. 
Genre-wise, Kross’s Gulag stories are very similar to Varlam Shalamov’s Kolyma Tales. 
Shalamov was a writer, journalist and Gulag survivor, who was arrested twice during the 
Stalinist era, and spent a total of approximately 17 years in the camps. The Kolyma Tales are 
noteworthy, as they offer a detailed and hopeless account of the camps as a stage for death 
and moral corruption. The length and intensity of Shalamov’s experiences are helpful for 
putting certain aspects of Kross’s works into a perspective, for example the cheerful 
unbreakability of Peeter Mirk, the narrator, as well as themes of curiosity, the prospect of 
maintaining one’s sense of solidarity with others, and playfulness. 
Kolyma Tales illustrated how moral barriers being pushed aside in the camps. The 
inmates realized that “it is possible to commit base acts – and live. It is possible to lie – and 
live … In camp a human being learns sloth, deception and viciousness,” and “all human 
emotions – love, friendship, envy, concern for one’s fellow man, compassion, longing for 
fame, honesty – had left us with the flesh that had melted from our bodies during their long 
fasts.” (Shalamov 1994, 41, 364) While life in the camps was generally hard, Shalamov 
described the mines as particularly destructive (Shalamov 1994, 291). Given those 
tendencies, it becomes a moral choice to avoid the destruction as long as possible, to retain 
one’s sense of solidarity. It is also interesting that the destruction that the camps entailed for 
the inmates’ emotional and physical lives has notable connections with Rorty’s emphasis on 
the relation between torture (as it occurs in 1984) and the personal narrative of the victim. 
The destruction of a human being’s physique, spirit and morality can occur over a much 
shorter time period than 17 years – Italian Jewish chemist and writer Primo Levi spent 11 
months in Auschwitz, and yet his most well-known book, If This Is A Man, speaks of the 
breaking of the inmates (‘the demolition of man’) to a similarly dark extent, with the hope, 
11 
 
dignity and self of the inmates being quickly removed in the camp, to use the words of 
Howard Jacobson who wrote the foreword to the 2013 edition of If This Is A Man (Levi 
1987, ii).2 
Levi and Shalamov both describe the process of automatization, through which the 
inmates turn machine-like, in the sense that their vocabularies shrink, and they give up 
asking questions. With Arendt (and also Rorty), one gets the feeling that this is indeed 
intentional: the aim of the camps is to break, to make the inmates think of themselves in the 
lowest possible terms. Inspired by Rorty, this process could be called adopting the ‘camp-
redescription’. Camp-redescription could be seen as a way in which a totalitarian system 
molds the minds of the people, in an attempt to eliminate their individuality and dominate 
them as one instead of many different individuals, as we know from Arendt’s accounts of 
totalitarian systems. Its power resides in the reduction of language, and transformation of 
complex human beings to merely body-oriented, predictable entities. The vocabulary of the 
descriptions of camp life, with all the sufferings and daily life, reveals the reduction of 
language that took place in the Soviet forced labor camps (as well as in the Nazi 
concentration and death camps). The intellectuals were in a particularly unfavorable 
position: “The intellectual convict is crushed by the camp. Everything he valued is ground 
into the dust while civilization and culture drop from him within weeks.” (Shalamov 1994, 
367) The descriptions of daily life revolve around food rations, rosy fingers, frostbitten 
fingers, toes full of pus, the decay of bodies, seeking and craving the warmth of sleeping 
shoulder-to-shoulder, etc. Regarding vocabulary, Shalamov wrote:  
My language was the crude language of the mines and it was as impoverished as the emotions 
that lived near the bones. Get up, go to work, dinner, end of work, rest, citizen, chief, may I 
speak, shovel, trench, yes sir, drill, pick, it’s cold outside, rain, cold soup, hot soup, bread, 
ration, leave me the butt – these few dozen words were all I had needed for years (Shalamov 
1994, 263). 
This kind of reduction of language is a response to the difficult conditions in which the 
inmates were put by the state. It can be distinguished from the reduction of vocabulary that 
is required by the state, as 1984 illustrated by introducing Newspeak.   
Italian philosopher, Giorgio Agamben has dedicated his book The Remnants of 
Auschwitz (Agamben 1999) to exploring the themes of witness, testimony, and the 
                                                 
2 Given that Shalamov’s and Levi’s books speak of a similar kind of destruction of the inmates, the 
difference between the time that they spent in the camps could be an important indicator of a difference in how 
the German and Soviet camps were organized and to some extent also in how the inmates were treated.  
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phenomenon of the Muselmann. In this book, Agamben collected Holocaust survivors’ 
accounts of the camps for his analysis. The Muselmann is a dark illustration to the scope of 
the destruction that is ever-present as a thread in Levi’s and Shalamov’s works, as well. In 
fact, Agamben’s analysis dwelled largely on If This Is A Man.  
All the Muselmänner who finish in the gas chamber have the same story, or more exactly, 
have no story …  Their life is short, but their number is endless; they, the Muselmänner, the 
drowned, form the backbone of the camp, an anonymous mass, continually renewed and 
always identical, of non-men who march and labour in silence, the divine spark dead in them, 
already too empty to really suffer. One hesitates to call them living: one hesitates to call their 
death death, in the face of which they have no fear, as they are too tired to understand. (Levi 
1987, 90) 
The Muselmänner had a different name in almost every camp in the Nazi camp system. 
Primo Levi called them “the drowned”, and they made up a considerable part of the whole 
camp population. It is important that Levi described the Muselmänner as people who had no 
story. They are “the drowned”, as Levi called them – metaphorically, we could say, they are 
drowned in meaninglessness.  
1.3 Kross’s labor camp stories: carefulness, curiosity and luck 
The important part – for our purposes – is that the difficult conditions in the camps are 
destructive not only for the physical and emotional well-being, but also for the ability to feel 
solidarity, reflect on moral dilemmas, and to make moral judgments. Hence, it is important 
for us to consider that Kross was fortunate and did not have to work in the mines, for 
example, for which he was considered too thin and tall in Inta. He had been warned against 
working in the mines, but he was given the work of transporting log platforms from railroad 
to sawmill before he could even express his preference for working on the ground. 
Altogether, he worked as a territory cleaner, log transporter, felt drier, coal enricher and 
occasionally as a snow shoveler in Inta (Kross 2003, 278–79). It is therefore understandable 
that Kross’s stories do not depict the absolute destruction of one’s emotional and moral 
faculty. However, Levi’s and Shalamov’s works highlight that such a destruction can, in 
cases less fortunate than Kross’s, be horrifyingly real.  
The perception of being lucky was there for Kross also during the German occupation in 
Estonia. He was arrested by the Sicherheitsdienst, the intelligence agency of the SS, 
interrogated and sent to the Tallinn Work and Education Camp, the former Central Prison, 
in April 1944. He found himself in the same cell with 4 other internees. The others were 
sentenced to death, vanishing from the cell one by one as days went by (except for the man 
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whom Kross named Lill). Kross experienced the growing anxiety and emptiness that the 
absence of the cellmates left behind. 
Turning back to the question of automatization and elimination of moral 
judgments/feelings of solidarity, it is relevant that this kind of automatization which comes 
with stopping to ask questions is not present in Kross’s stories of life in the Gulag camps 
and in the Estonian SSR. This is understandable in light of his experiences at the forced labor 
camps and at the hands of violent foreign powers. Instead of an existence that is “dead to the 
world” (Arendt 1998, 176), his works speak of curiosity in the narrator, moral considerations 
in the choices and behavior of the narrator and the fellow inmates, and an elaborate web of 
hopes, fears, desires and expectations which explain the characters’ behavior, choices and 
judgments. In this thesis, we discuss at length the playfulness that is present in most of 
Kross’s labor camp stories, and that is interwoven with some of the moral choices that the 
characters make.  
Even though Kross’s stories do not illuminate the extremities and the utmost potential of 
destruction that the camp experience entails, his works shed light on the ‘limbo’ of the camp 
experience, revolving around the experiences and (moral) choices of those who had good 
enough health, sufficient energy, and were fortunate enough to maintain a sense of solidarity, 
responsibility and/or concern for the fellow man. In coming to understand how moral 
judgments and decisions function at the meeting point of the individual and a repressive state 
apparatus, studying this ‘limbo’ of the camps is essential, as it was the reality for many 
people. The limbo allows us to take a closer look at the values and moral choices that can 
arise in very difficult, but not fully destructive conditions.  
If one takes Shalamov’s accounts of life in the camps seriously, it is also clear that a 
sufficiently long time in the Soviet camps, with hard work and a few unlucky contingencies, 
put the inmates in danger of losing any moral concerns, sense of solidarity, and 
responsibility. One of the basic assumptions of the task at hand is that studying moral choices 
is possible only in settings in which the spontaneity (and freedom of narrativity) of a person 
persists. However, while conducting an analysis of the choices and values that can emerge 
in the ‘limbo’, it is important to keep the perspective of destruction in mind, in its depth, 
seriousness and the consequence of this perspective existing: avoiding this destruction 
becomes itself a moral choice. We could say that coming to understand the seriousness of 
the ‘demolition of man’ (Levi 1987, ii) brings us closer to understanding what is at stake for 
many of the characters of Kross’s stories, given that Kross was aware of the level of 
demolition of human beings which he himself was fortunate enough to avoid. 
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Kross’s Gulag stories illuminate the moral and emotional half-tones between the two 
extremes that can be found at an individual’s ‘meeting point’ with a violent totalitarian state 
apparatus: the complete destruction of the camp inmates on physical, emotional and moral 
level, and the comfort of the normalized ‘moral blindness’ (to use Zygmunt Bauman’s 
phrase, (Bauman 2000)) of many of the bystanders and the less troubled, from which the 
banality of evil is born. Arendt’s analyses of the way totalitarian societies function are very 
helpful in giving meaning (in a larger socio-political framework) to the individual processes 
that Kross’s stories illustrate. Similarly, however, Kross’s stories highlight the particular 
moral complexities that arise due to the socio-political dynamics that Arendt has described 
and analyzed at length in The Origins of Totalitarianism.  
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2 Towards a synthesis of Arendt, Rorty, and Kross 
This chapter focuses on introducing the works of Arendt and Rorty (primarily excerpts 
from Origins of Totalitarianism, Eichmann in Jerusalem and Contingency, Irony, and 
Solidarity). Their key ideas (especially concerning themes of destruction, playfulness, and 
spontaneity) will be brought together and discussed in the third section of the chapter, where 
we present a philosophical framework for reading Kross. This framework is based on our 
discussion of Arendt’s and Rorty’s works, and incorporates some of the themes from Kross’s 
texts which will be opened further in the third chapter.  
2.1 On the destruction of a human being: senselessness and loss of spontaneity 
Arendt was indubitably one of the most prominent political thinkers who has dedicated 
her time and energy to researching totalitarianism. Her works, especially The Origins of 
Totalitarianism (Arendt 1985) and Eichmann in Jerusalem (Arendt 2006), highlight the 
novel aspects of the Third Reich and Stalin’s era in the Soviet Union – the systematic nature 
of the crimes against humanity, combined with their enormous scope and elaborate 
bureaucratic organization. She has pointed to the moral problem of the normalization of 
violence, reduction and transformation of language, and lack of resistance (silent and willing 
participation), from which the concept of the banality of evil emerges. In this subchapter, the 
aim is to outline those aspects in Arendt’s discussion of total domination that are most 
integral for our analysis.  
Her account of camps as the central institution of totalitarian regimes provides us with 
an understanding of the depth and meaning of the horrors which succeeded in molding the 
camp inmates into automated living corpses. Those changes include the shrinking and 
transformation of language (specifically, the vocabulary) people used, normalization of 
violence without being driven by hate or ideological conviction, and silent willing 
participation of a huge number of people in crimes against humanity. The appearance, 
utterances and behavior of SS-lieutenant colonel, major organizer of the Holocaust Adolf 
Eichmann at the trial before the Jerusalem District Court in 1961 inspired Arendt to develop 
the concept of banality of evil.3  
                                                 
3 However, Eichmann’s trial and the notion “banality of evil” marked a significant turning point in 
Arendt’s moral philosophy; in Origins of Totalitarianism, published 1951, she referred to radical and absolute 
evil in her accounts of the totalitarian terror, sometimes in quotation marks, sometimes without, signifying the 
worst possible evil:  
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2.1.1 The circumstances of terror: hopelessness and loss of meaning 
Arendt has drawn our attention to the unprecedented changes that totalitarianism brought 
to life in dialectics and language. Total domination exploded several moral and juridical 
distinctions and categories, rendering them empty and inapplicable due to the scope of the 
terror, destruction, and heinous acts which later became recognized as crimes against 
humanity. Besides the scope of terror which problematized the use and sensibility of 
concepts like “crime” and “justice”, totalitarian regimes established circumstances and 
situations which made it impossible to do good or even choose between good and evil, 
rendering the distinction useless. (In Arendt’s (2003, 122) words, “What meaning has the 
concept of murder when we are confronted with the mass production of corpses?”) In her 
discussion of the killing of the moral person in man, Arendt mentioned situations that are 
utterly hopeless – situations where even suicide is not a moral escape, as it may mean sending 
one’s friends and family to their immediate death. While this kind of situations are not unique 
to totalitarian systems, totalitarianism succeeded in normalizing and institutionalizing them.  
When a man is faced with the alternative of betraying and thus murdering his friends or 
sending his wife and children, for whom he is in every sense responsible, to their death; when 
even suicide would mean the immediate murder of his own family – how is he to decide? 
The alternative is no longer between good and evil, but between murder and murder. Who 
could have solved the dilemma of the Greek mother, who was allowed by the Nazis to choose 
which of her three children should be killed? (Arendt 2003, 133) 
The elimination of the “individualist escape” – a conscience whose decisions are sensible 
and/or unquestionable – carried the same token of meaninglessness and nihilism that Arendt 
has repeatedly mentioned with regard to totalitarianism. The inclusion of the masses by their 
support and participation in the large-scale killings as well as the blurring of the line between 
victim and perpetrator (inmates made responsible for the administration of various crimes) 
realized the totalitarian belief that everything is possible (Arendt 2003, 119).  
She outlined the novelty of totalitarian terror not just by emphasizing the unprecedented 
circumstances that exploded moral categories and introduced a sort of general dialectic 
meaninglessness, but also by drawing our attention to the meaninglessness and the air of 
                                                 
When the impossible was made possible it became the unpunishable, unforgivable absolute 
evil which could no longer be understood and explained by the evil motives of self-interest, 
greed, covetousness, resentment, lust for power, and cowardice; and which therefore anger 
could not revenge, love could not endure, friendship could not forgive. (Arendt 2003, 140) 
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madness that surrounded many aspects of the phenomenon of the camps. The senseless had 
an organizational, (inmate’s) experience, and remembrance aspect, and all of them together 
established an understanding of the camps as sites of rupture and isolation. Again, the fact 
that totalitarian atrocities cannot be made sense of with the existing vocabulary, with 
concepts such as good or evil, perpetrator or victim, life or death, brings us back to the 
enormity of the killings and destruction.  
Arendt categorized the final solution as completely anti-utilitarian, because killing 
millions of Jews, gypsies, homosexuals and numerous other groups of society was a costly 
and energy-consuming procedure that required money and efforts of co-ordination (e.g., for 
organizing deportations and for the building and maintenance of the camps). Thus, the 
senseless in the organization of the camps is evident. Most of this was done at a time when 
both financial and human resources were needed for winning the war.  
The unreality and loss of meaning manifested itself also in the experience of horrors in 
the camps. The scope of the sufferings, combined with the fact that they were often 
completely undeserved (as the camp inmates were mostly innocent people, not even 
criminals) made it useless and eventually impossible to ask questions. This experience-
aspect of senselessness in the camps is also related to the survivor’s accounts losing meaning, 
being unable to convince. As Agamben also pointed out in The Remnants of Auschwitz, death 
camps problematized the concept of witness and testimony, as the majority of the inmates 
of Auschwitz and other death camps perished without leaving a trace (the Muselmänner).  
The “true” witnesses, the “complete witnesses,” are those who did not bear witness and could 
not bear witness. They are those who “touched bottom”: the Muslims, the drowned. The 
survivors speak in their stead, by proxy, as pseudo-witnesses; they bear witness to a missing 
testimony. (Agamben 1999, 34) 
 The way the ‘Muslims’ perished – the decay of the body, the dying of the soul, and 
finally, the actual physical death – rendered leaving any message or testimony impossible. 
Arendt has dwelled on a similar point, claiming that neither recollection or eyewitness report 
can do much to enable our understanding of the horrors. The writer who attempts to 
communicate her or his experiences always senses “the terrible abyss that separates the 
world of the living from that of the living dead”, and so they are unable to produce anything 
more than a sequence of remembered occurrences which seem all too otherworldly for the 
reader to leave any impression (Arendt 2003, 122). 
The dialectic aspect of the senselessness which Arendt’s works address emerges with the 
example of death. In the sphere of the living dead, death loses its meaning. The concept of 
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“crime” is rendered futile, as there is a difference between murder and the mass-production 
of corpses.  
The concentration camps, by making death itself anonymous (making it impossible to find 
out whether a prisoner is dead or alive), robbed death of its meaning as the end of a fulfilled 
life. In a sense they took away the individual’s own death, proving that henceforth nothing 
belonged to him and he belonged to no one. His death merely set a seal on the fact that he 
had never really existed. (Arendt 2003, 133) 
Death was stripped of its dignity as “the end of a fulfilled life”. Those whose 
individuality has been destroyed are not alive, and yet their death is rendered meaningless, 
since any trace of the victim is wiped out; the victim, anonymous and isolated from the world 
of the living, perishes in a void of information.  
2.1.2 Stages in the “preparation of living corpses” 
As the unreality of the camp experiences emerges from the background of the complete 
destruction of a human being, it is important to see how Arendt described the destruction of 
human beings that is finalized in the camps. The complete destruction of human beings that 
she described is a larger social process of which the ‘demolition of man’, described by Levi 
and Shalamov, forms just a part. The three stages are related to the social dynamics that also 
enabled the general population to grow increasingly indifferent to the sufferings that various 
‘unwanted’ groups experienced: Arendt turned our attention to the growing social exclusion 
and sense of superfluousness that Jews, for example, experienced.  
The “preparation of living corpses” had three stages, according to Arendt: killing the 
juridical person in man, killing the moral person in man, and killing the individuality. The 
first stage, killing the juridical person in man, means leaving certain people out from the 
protection of the law and placing the concentration camps outside of the normal penal system 
(Arendt 2003, 128). Innocent people and criminals (who would be sent to the camp only 
after the completion of their prison sentence) lived in the camps side-by-side, while the 
criminals formed the aristocracy of the camps in both the Soviet and Nazi system (Arendt 
2003, 129).  
Different ranks of criminals – and identifying oneself as part of the “lowest” layer of the 
society – were part of the morally complex vocabulary in “Vürst”. As Arendt pointed out, 
criminals are an essential element in the camps, as they signify that the camp is an institution 
for ‘asocial elements’. This signification is important for propaganda reasons as well as for 
making it clear to the innocent inmates that they have landed among the lowest people of the 
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society (Arendt 2003, 129). Arendt described the camps as a system of punishment which is 
designed to be unpredictable, thus exploding the legal categories of ‘guilty’ and ‘innocent’; 
In case of “Vürst”, the effect is a curious kind of internalization of belonging among the 
lowest of the low, which – although it leads to immoral choices at the first glance – turns out 
to be an instrument for carrying out a choice that I interpret as a form of resistance and as a 
moral choice. (By this, we mean the choice to play.)  
However, Basile’s self-identification as a rascal does not speak for the experience of 
Kross himself. In his book of memoirs, Kallid kaasteelised (Dear Co-Travelers, Kross 
2003), Kross described his arrest and detention during the German occupation as well as the 
life and work in Siberia and Komi with a feeling of clear distance from the criminals in the 
camps and prison, and completely without a sense of guilt. His attitude towards the company 
of the blatnois (the criminals) and the conditions of the camps overall could rather be 
concluded with the words of Peeter Mirk from the short story “Tuhatoos” (“The Ash Tray”). 
Mirk reflected on the company in which he ended up on his way to the camp, in the train 
compartment:  
Regarding the attitude towards the situation in general and towards blending in, especially, I 
had if not a flawlessly practicable stance, then at least a guiding attitude-ideal already since 
long: regard the situations like an interested and observant tourist and blend into the 
surroundings as much as is needed to avoid troublesome tensions, but internally never blend 
in with anything or anyone here. (Kross 2004, 53–54) 
In addition to Mirk’s ideals regarding the situation and blending in, we find ironic 
attitudes towards criminals as “the friends of power” in “Tuhatoos”, which is a further 
indication of the fact that the arbitrariness of the arrests worked against the propagandistic 
goal of establishing the camp inmates as members of the lowest layer of society: the sense 
of injustice (which we find, for example, in Kross’s novel Väljakaevamised) keeps one from 
identifying oneself with the criminals and keeps the distinction between a victim (of 
injustice) and a punishment-deserving culprit intact, although Mirk never regarded himself 
as a victim, but rather as a representative of the contingencies of the place and time he 
inhabits. He did, undeniably, sense the objectification that came with the arrests and the fact 
that suddenly, he – as an intellectual, law-abiding Estonian citizen – was left outside from 
the protection of the law. The sense of objectification was present in his numerous 
encounters with the occupation-time authorities, described in “Stahli grammatika,” (“Stahl’s 
Grammar”) as well as “Morse” (“Morse”) and other short stories, for example: “… we were 
mere objects for [the captain]. With whom there should not be any communication. At least 
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not while the colleagues are watching.” (Kross 2004, 367) Instead of having an internalizing 
effect, being objectified by the power seemed to fuel Mirk’s careful and yet playful attitude 
and occasional manipulation with the power apparatus.  
There is a difference between the experiences of Estonians under the rule of Soviet 
Union, and Jews in the Third Reich and occupied territories. The sudden switch of power 
apparatus that occurred in Estonia in 1940 with the establishment of Johannes Vares’ 
government and the staged coup d’état which resulted in joining Estonia the Soviet Union 
rendered Estonian legal system de facto outdated, while the Republic of Estonia still existed 
in exile. In contrast, Hitler’s seizure of power in 1933 could rather be seen as a result of the 
inner tensions and crises in the Weimar Republic, instead of external intervention. This also 
meant that the legal system of the republic perished with the state, and the Nuremberg laws 
of 1935 deprived the Jews of their citizenship, basic rights, and the protection of the law. 
Hence, the killing of the juridical person in man was conducted differently in the Stalinist 
Soviet Union and the Third Reich, which might also explain why Mirk, as a character, was 
less affected (in the sense of disregarding the status given to him) by being categorized as 
“asocial” and finding himself among the lowest layers, the criminals, and subject to contempt 
and objectification. However, Arendt’s discussion of the camp as an institution for ‘asocial 
elements’ remains relevant for understanding the camp experiences that Kross’s stories 
incorporate. This is due to the daily company of the criminals whose language, behavior and 
manners set a norm. In a sense, we are referring to a horizon of experiences that bordered 
one’s perspective and sense of normality, providing a kind of “script” of expected behavior.  
The second stage was the killing of the moral person in man. For Arendt, the core of this 
stage lies in the banishment of memory, which renders the deaths and lives of the victims 
worthless, stripping them of the dignity of being remembered, grieved and thought of with 
fondness by one’s family and friends. She pointed to how personal ties with a friend or 
spouse are broken behind the other party’s back, metaphorically at gunpoint – this was done, 
for example, in order to save the lives of oneself and/or the children, as was the case with 
many wives of arrested men (Arendt 2003, 132). Kolyma Tales speaks of the same kind of 
maneuvers, made by wives and daughters, and in Shalamov’s stories, the (emotional) 
meaning of this move is made painfully clear with the response of the man whose beloved 
daughter has officially denounced and rejected him: the reaction is that of a man who has 
lost his last emotional anchor.  
Killing the moral person in man is a nuanced phenomenon: on the one hand, Arendt 
emphasized that the inmates cease to be subjects of moral behavior because their existence 
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loses social meaning; on the other hand, she brought out that opposition might be found in 
the conscience of the people who are sent to their death:  
This attack on the moral person might still have been opposed by man’s conscience which 
tells him that it is better to die a victim than to live as a bureaucrat of murder. Totalitarian 
terror achieved its most terrible triumph when it succeeded in cutting the moral person off 
from the individualist escape and in making the decisions of conscience absolutely 
questionable and equivocal. When a man is faced with the alternative of betraying and thus 
murdering his friends or of sending his wife and children, for whom he is in every way 
responsible, to their death … how is he to decide? (Arendt 2003, 133) 
This aspect of the destruction of the moral person focuses on the lack of a good option; 
the destruction of a moral person resides in the fact that one can no longer choose between 
good and evil, but murder and murder. There is no way to get away with a clean conscience, 
and the distinction between the categories of the victim and the perpetrator become blurred. 
However, to those two nuances of eliminating the moral person that Arendt highlighted, 
Levi’s and Shalamov’s works add a third: the loss of empathy and concern for fellow man, 
i.e. becoming unable to make moral choices at all, because any concerns over solidarity fall 
to the background of one’s mind. This loss occurs because of the circumstances in which it 
is difficult and often impossible to think of anything, as we have seen, and to direct one’s 
behavior in any other way than towards physical survival.  
This aspect of the destruction is closely connected to the third stage in the “preparation 
of a living corpse”, which Arendt recognized as the ultimate effect of the camps: the removal 
of spontaneity and individuality (Arendt 2003, 119). Eliminating individuality is almost 
always successful after the juridical and moral person in man have been killed. It manifests 
itself in lack of resistance, as “millions of human beings allowed themselves to be marched 
into the gas chambers” (Arendt 2003, 135). To kill the uniqueness and individuality is to 
destroy a person’s ability to begin anything new out of their own volition (as an action, as 
opposed to a reaction), to be spontaneous – it is a sign of complete submission. Even though 
for the most part of The Origins of Totalitarianism, Arendt stressed the lack of utilitarian 
motives in total domination, she recognized the destruction of identity and spontaneity as 
purposeful actions – their utility resides in submission itself, as it testifies that the system is 
capable of “keeping a whole people in slavery” (Arendt 2003, 135). 
Indeed, as Arendt described it, the removal of spontaneity is a process that aims to reduce 
every person to a “never-changing identity of reactions”, and this bundle of reactions could 
be changed according to the will of the authorities, we could see the removal of moral faculty 
from everyday matters as a part – and consequence – of the removal of spontaneity. This is 
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important, since spontaneity cannot be removed under normal circumstances, as it is 
connected not only with freedom but with life, “in the sense of simply keeping alive” (Arendt 
2003, 120). In a sense, spontaneity was systematically reduced also in the elaborate 
bureaucratic machinery which was an essential tool for organizing mass-killings, although 
it was not removed completely as in the case of the camp inmates: Arendt has lengthily 
described the banality of evil in Adolf Eichmann, whose trial she observed in Jerusalem. She 
noted that his speech was full of clichés and stock phrases, with thoughtlessness and 
comfortable platitudes coloring his ways of speaking.  
The difference is that in his case, the issue of responsibility is more burningly present 
than with the inmates whose options to act against the circumstances created by the 
authorities and enforced by camp officials were limited. Eichmann did not live in the 
‘preparation of living corpses’, the fatally difficult circumstances of hunger, cold, 
humiliation, fear of death, and exhaustion. While the loss of spontaneity was simply pushed 
on the camp inmates by altering their living conditions, the same does not hold in 
Eichmann’s case. In his case, the process was assumedly much less ‘automatic’ than with 
the camp inmates, in the sense that the creation of the new normal required his (and others’ 
of his kind) endorsement and participation. Even language-wise, the reduction of his 
vocabulary to Officialese which was maximally disconnected from the actual experiences of 
the Jews, homosexuals, gypsies, Poles and other persecuted and exterminated groups, was a 
process which required a transition from the words and values he used and possessed before 
the Third Reich to the new set of values designed for life-distant bureaucrats, an acceptance 
of the new norm.  
 In her essay “Personal Responsibility Under Dictatorship”(Arendt 2003, 44), Arendt has 
shown the problem that arises in the context of a totalitarian regime with regard to a unified 
and consistent, fixed set of values. She pointed to how the members of respectable society 
yielded to the new order, which in her view could be considered a proof that their 
consciences were functioning in an almost automatic way. One system of values was 
exchanged for another. Exchanging one set of values for another was also largely the point 
of emergence for the concept of the banality of evil (1971, 7). 
Those who chose not to participate in the totalitarian regimes, however, did not base their 
actions on a set of rules, which could be applied to any particular cases that one encounters 
in life. In that way, every new experience or situation one can find is already prejudged 
beforehand. Instead of applying the learned rule, the people whom Arendt had in mind – the 
non-participants – turned towards thinking in the sense of asking and answering the question 
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to what extent they would still be able to live in peace with themselves after having 
committed certain deeds (Arendt 2003a, 44).  
The kind of thinking that Arendt emphasized is not technical by its nature, nor is it even 
concerned with theoretical problems. The part that is important for us here is the spontaneous 
action on the side of those who chose not to participate and who did not treat moral choices 
as technical problems to which one conclusive formula can be applied. While the camp 
system attempted to mold the inmates into non-thinking, non-willing automatons, similar 
processes happened (due to different circumstances, in different ways) with the general 
population of workers, bureaucrats and people who had nothing to do with the camps – 
people who led their everyday lives in the Third Reich or Stalinist Soviet Union. The shift 
in values (and their fixed, generic nature), the changed language, and blindness to violence 
in Hitler’s and Stalin’s policies indicate a similar kind of automatization-process as the 
killing of spontaneity in the camps.  
In the light of this analysis of stages of destruction that Arendt outlined in her works, the 
question arises: what remains in the camp, if there is no hope? What are the (moral) choices 
for the people who are subject to willful destruction and sufferings, given that the final result 
is the death of the juridical, moral, and unique person in the camp inmate? Once the unique 
person in a human being is killed, no choices and no empathy remains. This does not only 
spell doom for the person whose moral faculty perishes: it also means the corruption of 
relationships, and a transition into unworldliness to an even greater extent. In this light, 
playfulness (which is by far not possible or accessible for everyone in the camps, but under 
certain circumstances, such possibility might arise) becomes a form of resistance, which – 
through resistance as such – maintains the unique identity of the person, as opposition and 
action keep alive those spaces that distinguish us from others and prevent us from dissolving 
into one with them. It could also be seen as a moral choice, which contributes to maintaining 
one’s ability to keep making moral choices, even if the future is dark and short. 
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2.2 Rorty’s conceptual toolbox and totalitarianism: redescription and 
unmaking someone’s world 
In his book Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Richard Rorty presented his view about 
private and public aspirations with the help of a theoretical framework that employs the 
concepts of contingency, private (and public) irony, social hope, and solidarity and moral 
progress. At the core of Rorty’s project in the book lies the attempt to show that the public 
and private aspirations are equally valid and yet, in many aspects, completely 
incommensurable (Rorty 1989, xv). Questions about the distinctions between private and 
public are addressed with the help of his conceptual framework which employs notions of 
redescription and vocabulary among others.  In his discussion of 1984, he addressed issues 
such as cruelty, humiliation, and unmaking someone’s world, which enable interesting 
connections and bridges with Arendt’s political philosophy.  
Rorty’s ideas have not been relevantly presented in debates on totalitarianism and its 
moral issues. In some aspects, the horrors of Auschwitz and Gulag have been thought to 
represent a firm point of criticism against Rorty’s anti-foundationalist views on truth and 
language, as the memory of the death camps, violent occupations and repressions seems to 
call for certainty and a strong foundation for human rights. Those sentiments are well 
represented by Michael Sandel’s criticism of Rorty’s anti-foundationalism:  
If one's convictions are only relatively valid, why stand for them unflinchingly? In a 
tragically configured moral universe, such as Berlin assumes, is the ideal of freedom any less 
subject than competing ideals to the ultimate incommensurability of values? If so, in what 
can its privileged status consist? And if freedom has no morally privileged status, if it is just 
one value among many, then what can be said for liberalism? (Sandel 1984, 8) 
From Sandel’s perspective, Rorty’s ideas – e.g. that truth is a characteristic of sentences 
between which people make choices, and that there are no moral facts out there, waiting to 
be discovered – might indeed look dangerous for liberalism. However, Rorty’s response to 
Sandel drew our attention to the fact that Sandel’s question, “in what can the privileged status 
of the ideal of freedom consist?” demands for some kind of criteria. The question makes 
sense in a framework which relies on criteria as the basis of justification. This is a framework 
that Rorty abandoned. Instead, he encouraged us to think in terms other than criteria, and 
saw the tendency to justify a claim on the basis of certain criteria as “a species of the more 
general temptation to think of the world, or the human self, as possessing an intrinsic nature, 
an essence,” and instead of correspondence to reality, he emphasized free discussion as the 
practice which determines the justification of sentences (Rorty 1989, 6, 84). Besides Sandel, 
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several other authors have criticized Rorty’s views regarding politics, morality, and truth. 
However, we explore the question of how things might look like if we took seriously some 
of Rorty’s central ideas and explored them further. The idea behind this section of the thesis 
is similar to the idea behind the last subchapter (on Arendt): we focus on explaining some 
of the key terms in Rorty’s conceptual toolbox (for example, his approach to solidarity, 
vocabulary, and redescription), and reflect of Rorty’s discussion of cruelty, tentatively 
highlighting the aspects that are relevant for reading Kross’s texts.  
2.2.1 On solidarity, redescription, and vocabulary 
Rorty’s project of showing the private and public aspirations as equally valid and yet 
forever incommensurable is of interest for us especially in places where he discussed books 
that sensitize us to the sufferings of others – those are books of public importance – and 
books that aim to offer aesthetic bliss, thus helping us pursue autonomy and self-perfection. 
 He discussed Orwell’s 1984 as an example of the kind of book which makes us aware 
of various forms of suffering. Nabokov’s Lolita and Pale Fire fall into the same rough 
category, but they are relevant for the liberal hope in different ways: they demonstrate the 
compatibility of cruelty with a sensitive, artistic character. Rorty was particularly interested 
in the kind of books that dramatize the tension between our attempts at autonomy and our 
duties towards others by highlighting the pain and harm that can be caused in the course of 
striving for private perfection and aesthetic bliss. While 1984 illuminates the effects of social 
practices and institutions on people, Nabokov’s works demonstrate ways how we (as 
individuals) can be cruel to other people.  
Books that sensitize us to the sufferings of others play a role in moral progress (if such a 
thing exists) as Rorty saw it. Such books help us widen our sphere of “us”.  Rorty’s 
discussion of moral progress emerged from Wilfrid Sellars’ notion of “we-intentions”, which 
focused on the status of being considered “one of us”, where “us” is a particular group of 
people smaller than humanity, expressed in phrases such as “our sort of people”, “a comrade 
in the [radical] movement”, “a Greek like ourselves”, or “a fellow Catholic”. Rorty claimed 
that the argument about belonging to a particular group possesses more force than the 
argument of being “one of us human beings” and that “feelings of solidarity are necessarily 
a matter of which differences strike us as salient” (Rorty 1989, 190, 192). Moral progress, 
for Rorty, is about including more of the different people, the strangers, in the sphere of “us”. 
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Rather, [solidarity] is thought of as the ability to see more and more of the traditional 
differences (of tribe, religion, race, custom) as unimportant when compared with similarities 
with respect to pain and humiliation – the ability to think of people wildly different from 
ourselves as included in the range of “us”. That is why I said, in chapter 4, that detailed 
descriptions of particular varieties of pain and humiliation (in, e.g., novels or ethnographies) 
rather than philosophical or religious treatises, were the modern intellectual’s principal 
contributions to moral progress. (Rorty 1989, 192) 
Rorty emphasized the role of novels and ethnographies, as they are powerful mediums 
of redescription, and redescription allows us change our perspective of describing things – 
thus also changing how we understand them. Hence, it also enables us to shift emphasis to 
the similarities, rather than the differences, that a perceived group of “us” has with another 
group, identified as “them”. Redescription occupies a relevant, or perhaps even the central, 
place in Rorty’s project of detangling the private and the public aspirations and reflecting on 
moral progress, private irony and liberal hope. The importance of redescription emerges 
from Rorty’s understanding of language as a phenomenon that is our creation, subject to 
selectivity and prioritization rather than a representation of a reality out there. He did not 
define “redescription”, but one gets a sense for the meaning of the word from the context in 
which he uses the term. His use of the concept of redescription emerges from his 
epistemological stance: while the world might be out there (meaning, independently of us), 
descriptions of the world are not – we create the descriptions, manipulate with them, choose 
among them, etc. Truth and falsity are characteristics of those descriptions, but two very 
different descriptions can be true at the same time (although not necessarily always). While 
confining our attention to single sentences enables us to let the world dictate the truth or 
falsity of descriptions (and hence choosing between such sentences is often easy), the same 
does not hold with vocabularies which enable the descriptions and in which descriptions are 
phrased.  
In Rorty’s conceptual toolbox, a vocabulary denotes a set of concepts which constitutes 
a coherent linguistic and cultural entity. In speaking of different language games (a term 
which Rorty borrowed from Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations), Rorty listed the 
vocabulary of ancient Athenian politics (compared with Jefferson’s), the moral vocabularies 
of Saint Paul and Freud, the jargon of Newton versus that of Aristotle, etc. Those are 
examples of large-scale descriptions of the world, which support Rorty’s claim that we (and 
not the world) choose between such descriptions. The message is that different vocabularies 
are good for different purposes (Rorty 1989, 5–6), and it would not make sense to say that 
one of such vocabularies is more true than another. Which vocabulary happens to dominate 
the public discourse is a contingent, not predetermined matter. 
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Rorty used the term “final vocabulary” to denote the set of words which each of us 
employs to justify their actions, beliefs, lives. This kind of vocabulary is final in the sense 
that “if doubt is cast on the worth of these words, their user has no noncircular argumentative 
recourse.” (Rorty 1989, 73) Rorty made a distinction between people who maintain a certain 
awareness of and distance from their own final vocabulary, and those who take it for granted. 
He calls the first kind of people ironists. Ironists have “radical and continuing doubts about 
the final vocabulary [they] currently use … [They] realize that argument phrased in her 
present vocabulary can neither underwrite nor dissolve those doubts … [They] do not think 
that their vocabulary is closer to reality than others.” (Rorty 1989, 73) The second kind of 
people are “metaphysicians” in Rorty’s jargon: people who intend to uncover the nature of 
the phenomena they are studying, and do not question the final vocabulary that guides their 
quest for truth. “[The metaphysician] is still attached to common sense … He does not 
redescribe but, rather, analyzes old descriptions with the help of other old descriptions.” 
(Rorty 1989, 74) 
So, descriptions of the same phenomenon can be given in various vocabularies. As we 
see, Rorty’s notion of irony emphasizes that point, and builds the figure of the ironist from 
it. The ironist helps us see what is to be understood by “redescription” – does it denote 
shifting around in the same vocabulary (using different words that are part of the same 
language game), or does it rather refer to changing the vocabulary? As Rorty wrote, an ironist 
is someone who has radical and continuing doubts about their own final vocabulary, because 
they are aware of the diversity of vocabularies, having been impressed by many of them via 
books, for example. The ironist realizes that “anything can be made to look good or bad by 
being redescribed” (Rorty 1989, 73). The distance that the ironist maintains from their own 
final vocabulary stems from their awareness of the power of redescription. So, we have seen 
that a description is a linguistic entity that is concerned with reflecting on the characteristics 
of a certain phenomenon with the help of a particular vocabulary; redescription, then, is 
describing again and differently, i.e. offering a reflection on the same phenomenon in a 
different vocabulary. 
Emphasizing the diversity of equally useful (for different purposes) and yet different 
vocabularies is compatible with Rorty’s liberalism. He has also handled the question of 
taboos in language, speaking of the hierarchy of discussion questions that characterizes 
totalitarianism: he pointed out that liberalism aims to avoid the kind of general agreement in 
society which settles certain questions were always in point, certain questions prior to certain 
others, and there was a fixed order of discussion, flanking movements not permitted. It is 
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evident that language rules in the Third Reich resulted in the decrease of the amount of 
possible, legitimate vocabularies and ways to express oneself. Indeed, Rorty has pointed out 
how problematic such an act of narrowing is from a liberalist’s point of view. “That would 
be just the sort of society that liberals are trying to avoid – one in which “logic” ruled and 
“rhetoric” was outlawed.” (Rorty 1989, 51) 
2.2.2 O’Brien and cruelty in 1984: unmaking someone’s world 
Rorty’s liberal utopia cherishes freedom of speech and thought. In his discussion of 1984, 
Rorty addressed the question whether the focus of Orwell’s work was on the connection that 
our utterances have with reality (the importance of an objective truth), or rather on the 
importance of our freedom to say what we think is true. This discussion is inspired by the 
last part of 1984, where O’Brien was torturing Winston. Rorty’s analysis of the torture 
scenes is manifold, as he dwelled on several aspects of it: the relevance of O’Brien’s 
character, the meaning and purpose of the torture, and the question whether the fact that 
O’Brien forced Winston to admit that two and two makes five problematizes the loss of 
objective truth or the loss of Winston’s freedom to say what he thinks is true. Rorty offered 
an interpretation which shifts the emphasis away from the actual truthfulness of Winston’s 
belief. According to his reading of 1984, the torture would have succeeded in breaking 
Winston even if he had held a false belief and been subject to the forcible tearing down of 
the belief itself, as well as the linguistic structures that make up his narrative world. 
All that matters is that if you do believe [that two and two make four], you can say it without 
getting hurt. In other words, what matters is your ability to talk to other people about what 
seems to you true, not what is in fact true. If we take care of freedom, truth can take care of 
itself. (Rorty 1989, 176) 
Rorty saw “two plus two makes four” as a symbolic: a true statement, the truth value of 
which was important for Winston. However, an untrue claim could have been just as integral 
for Winston’s sense of self and coherence, as Rorty wrote. 
This interpretation is unsurprising, given Rorty’s general conceptual toolbox and the 
emphasis that he put on final vocabularies: they are integral for our sense of self and 
understanding of the world. When turning to his discussion of cruelty in Orwell’s 1984, 
Rorty made a strong claim:  
There is nothing to people except what has been socialized into them – their ability to use 
language, and thereby to exchange beliefs and desires with other people … To be a person 
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is to speak a particular language, one which enables us to discuss particular beliefs and 
desires with particular sorts of people. (Rorty 1989, 177) 
This quote speaks of his view of human beings where the crucial element of our human-
ness is the cultural aspect in us, the language. Even if we reject the strong variant of Rorty’s 
claim and rather say that the physiological construction of human beings mingles with the 
socialized aspects in intricate ways instead of insisting that there is nothing to people but 
socialization, we can still appreciate the emphasis that Rorty set on our socialized, narrative 
ways of being. The beliefs and desires that are crucial for one’s identity are understood and 
expressed thanks to the linguistic capacities that we possess. Rorty drew our attention to 
vocabulary, which enables us to express those beliefs and desires, and give meaning to them 
– i.e., to give them a place in a certain kind of story. 
The task that Orwell carried out with 1984, according to Rorty’s interpretation, was to 
sensitize his audience to the forms of cruelty that the audience had not noticed, and to “give 
us an alternative context, an alternative perspective, from which we liberals, the people who 
think that cruelty is the worst thing we do, could describe the political history of our century.” 
(Rorty 1989, 173) According to Rorty, Orwell’s project (as well as that of Solzhenitsyn’s et 
al.) is particularly valuable for the redescription that it offers – the vocabulary, perspective 
and context which Orwell utilizes show what a totalitarian system can look like, what kind 
of sufferings it can cause. It constituted a warning, advising against the use of a certain kind 
of vocabulary – the kind that is used at the Ministry of Truth.  
This redescription of the post-World War II political situation was not the only 
achievement of 1984. Rorty brought Orwell’s depiction of O’Brien to our attention. The 
message that accompanied Orwell’s portrayal of O’Brien, as Rorty read it, is somewhat 
similar to that of the characters of Humbert and Kinbote in Nabokov’s books: a combination 
of perfect intellectuality and cruelty. Rorty’s interpretation of the view that Orwell offered 
through his creation of O’Brien is particularly sinister:  
[Orwell] convinced us that there was a perfectly good chance that the same developments 
which had made human equality technically possible might make endless slavery possible. 
He did so by convincing us that nothing in the nature of truth, or man, or history was going 
to block that scenario, any more than it was going to underwrite the scenario which liberals 
had been using between the wars. He convinced us that all the intellectual and poetic gifts 
which had made Greek philosophy, modern science, and romantic poetry possible might 
someday find employment in the Ministry of Truth. (Rorty 1989, 175–76) 
Rorty responded to the critics who claimed that the third part of 1984 deteriorated and 
that Winston’s reactions in the torture scenes seemed unrealistic, clearly written by someone 
who had not experienced torture. He defended the book, presenting his reading which saw 
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O’Brien as the central figure in focus in the torture scenes, instead of Winston; it was about 
torturing, not being tortured. The torture that O’Brien put Winston through was not arbitrary, 
impulsive, nor aimed for making Winston accept the Party doctrine. O’Brien put Winston 
through the kind of torture that is specific to humans as linguistic beings. Rorty wrote:  
O’Brien reminds us that human beings who have been socialized – socialized in any 
language, any culture – do share a capacity which other animals lack. They can all be given 
a special kind of pain: they can all be humiliated by the forcible tearing down of the particular 
structures of language and belief in which they were socialized (or which they pride 
themselves on having formed for themselves). (Rorty 1989, 177) 
In the view that Rorty offered, the aim of sadism – and particularly in cases like that of 
O’Brien – is not mere pain, but humiliation. There is an element of humiliation present in 
the act of “tearing human minds to pieces and putting them together again in new shapes of 
your own choosing.” (Rorty 1989, 177) Rorty drew on Elaine Scarry’s account of torture in 
The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World (Scarry 1987), and concluded 
that the worst thing one can do to a subject of torture is not just to cause pain and agony, but 
to make sufferings such that the person who underwent the torture will later be unable to 
reconstitute themselves. This is achieved by making them say, do, think or desire things 
which they will later be unable to come to terms with having done or thought (Rorty 1989, 
178). In Scarry’s words, the torturer can “unmake the world” of the tortured by rendering 
them unable to use language to describe what they have been.  
Naturally, to unmake someone’s world, their most important beliefs, desires and fears 
have to be addressed during the torture. Rorty assumed that for each of us, there is probably 
a sentence we cannot utter sincerely and still put ourselves together, as well as the worst 
thing in the world which could make us utter that sentence. For Winston, this sentence was 
“Do it to Julia!”, and the utterance was triggered by rats, the worst thing in Winston’s world. 
The aim of the torture was not merely to make Winston endorse the Party doctrine (Rorty 
1989, 179). The aim was the breaking of the person– “the sound of tearing” the mind apart 
– rather than putting the tortured person’s mind together again in the forms and shapes of 
one’s choosing.  
2.3 Philosophical framework for reading literature on totalitarianism 
In this section, we synthesize Rorty’s ideas with those of Arendt. While Arendt’s and 
Rorty’s views depart strongly in certain things (Arendt was strongly influenced by Immanuel 
Kant, who could be seen as Rorty’s “greatest nemesis”), they come together in other things. 
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We will demonstrate how Rorty’s ideas on final vocabularies/redescription/irony and cruelty 
constitute a valuable additional voice to Arendt’s reflections on the most pressing political 
issues of 20th century, namely the problem of complete destruction and circumstances which 
bring to life both morally and physically inescapable situations. Upon a closer reading of 
Rorty, it comes to light that many of the conceptual tools he uses are complementary to 
Arendt’s reflections on death camps, total domination and destruction. 
Arendt’s works were guided by the emphasis on a functioning conscience, independent 
moral thought, and human dignity. There was not a trace of relativism (or pragmatism) in 
her writings, which is why this synthesis is a particularly interesting and challenging task. 
She spoke of evil, a word that which carried strong moral importance in her works, while 
Rorty never addressed the problem of evil: he wrote about cruelty instead. This is important 
for understanding the difference between the overall philosophies/social theories that Arendt 
and Rorty cultivated: since evil is a concept rooted in religion and ‘metaphysician’ moral 
philosophy (i.e., the kind of moral philosophy that seeks grounding and essence), it does not 
fit into Rorty’s conceptual toolbox. In the other direction, it is clear that “cruel” is too modest 
of a word for Arendt’s project, which focused on highlighting the unbelievable scope and 
depth of horrors and destruction that certain social institutions and practices brought with 
them.  
Rorty’s conceptual toolbox disconnected the urgent and pressing social concerns, 
including moral progress, from a search for stable philosophical foundation and the inner 
nature of those (important and/or urgent, as defined by the members of society via 
conversational practices) social phenomena. However, in his discussion of cruelty, Rorty 
dwelled on themes of total domination and the unmaking of someone’s world, for example, 
which indicates a lack of conflict between his use of the term “cruel” and Arendt’s use of 
the concept of “evil” – they come together in the cases which serve as examples of evil and 
cruelty, as Arendt elaborated on similar themes while presenting those occurrences as 
examples of evil rather than cruelty. 
2.3.1 Unmaking someone’s world and eliminating spontaneity 
We have illuminated one side of the problem of language and freedom of narrativity in 
totalitarianism, namely that which concerns reduction of vocabulary and banality of evil. 
The relationship between our freedom of narrativity, freedom to redescribe and say what we 
believe is true, and radical evil is another side of that problem. Speaking of radical evil, we 
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should turn to the example of O’Brien in 1984. Rorty interpreted O’Brien as a warning, 
because he was dangerous and possible. “[Orwell] invented him to warn us against him, like 
one might warn against a typhoon or a rogue elephant.” (Rorty 1989, 176)  
However, people are likely to take preventive measures against a typhoon and a rogue 
elephant. The aspects of Rorty’s pragmatism which emphasize that we choose between 
vocabularies do, indeed, indicate our responsibility in avoiding empowering possible 
O’Briens by doing all we can to not favor the ways of speaking that are characteristic of the 
Ministry of Truth. This realization emerges only if we think of the context in which O’Brien 
lived and worked more broadly. O’Brien’s cruelty and intelligence are most dangerous in a 
system which legitimizes and systematically calls to life the kind of sufferings that O’Brien 
inflicts on Winston, for example. This statement emerges from the realization, emphasized 
in several of Arendt’s works, that the institutional and bureaucratic organization of the 
totalitarian regimes (as well as the development of mass movements) were behind the scope 
and efficiency of the crimes against humanity that were conducted both in the Third Reich 
and in Stalin’s Soviet Union.  
While O’Brien could be seen as an embodiment of radical evil, with his intelligence, 
sensitivity to the world, to other people’s feelings and states of mind, and his deliberate 
cruelty, Arendt’s reflections on banality of evil and the vast network of bureaucracy (with 
its numerous workers) that were essential for the organization of totalitarian regimes suggest 
that a deliberate wish to torture, cause suffering and “re-make” human minds did not 
necessarily characterize the individual people who worked for the Third Reich and 
contributed to the functioning of death camps and the great machinery of oppression; rather, 
as Arendt wrote in her report of Eichmann’s trial, it was thoughtlessness which enabled the 
collaboration. The collaboration, in turn, enabled the mass killings of several 
groups/categories of people (Jews, gypsies, homosexuals, the disabled, freemasons, 
Slovenes, Jehovah’s witnesses, Spanish republicans, Soviet POWs).  
However, torture and “re-making” of the human beings (or rather, as we shall argue, “un-
making”) were the reality of the camps, regardless of whether the torture – in more and less 
metaphorical sense – was administered by O’Briens or more thoughtless people caught by 
the banality of evil. As Arendt argued, this un-making of people was in certain aspects useful 
for the government. The submission of the inmates, which was one important stage in their 
complete destruction, served as a guarantee that the regime is capable of “holding a whole 
people in slavery” (Arendt 2003, 135). If we combine the elimination of spontaneity, which 
Arendt emphasized as the ultimate goal and effect of the horrors, with survivors’ accounts 
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of what life and people in the Auschwitz and Gulag looked like, we get something that is 
chillingly similar to the unmaking that Rorty described. That is to say, in the Muselmänner 
the freedom of narrativity perishes – memories, hopes, sense of identity and uniqueness, and 
let alone curiosity and spontaneity; anything but a shadow of their biological self vanishes.  
2.3.2 Senselessness, stopping to ask questions, and freedom of narrativity in the 
camps 
However, with 1984 Rorty was discussing an occurrence of torture that took place one-
to-one, with Winston being the subject of O’Brien’s 7-year-long observation. Such personal 
attention was not the rule in the camps, and the tearing down of the particular structures of 
language and belief that the inmates possessed occurred via a different path. According to 
our interpretation, it was the combination of the intensity (greatness) and the senselessness 
of the sufferings which, over time, exploded the freedom of narrativity in the victims and 
rendered them incapable of thinking, reflecting, desiring, hoping, and in the most extreme 
cases, even fearing.4  
A sense of amazement and the futility of asking “Why?” – a phenomenon that Arendt 
also turned her attention to – is evident throughout the book, and echoes also from the stories 
of other survivors, including the survivors of the Soviet camps (although, as has been already 
mentioned in Chapter 1, the complete breaking and destruction of the inmates emotional and 
physical selves was not as quick as in the German camps). Rorty’s description of this kind 
of torture, its aim, and the loss of freedom of narrativity we describe resonate with Arendt’s 
reflections on the air of unreality and madness that surrounded the camps (extermination 
camps in particular). Arendt saw the concentration and extermination camps as stages for 
verifying the belief “everything is possible” (Arendt 2003, 119), including turning people 
into machine-like beings. 
The survivor stories that, for example, Agamben brings to us in Remnants of Auschwitz 
allow a convergence with Arendt’s conclusions about the camps’ aim: to break and subdue. 
Shalamov’s writings about life in Kolyma forced labor camps speak of the same kind of 
breaking. For example, Shalamov used the phrase “distracted bitterness” to describe the state 
of lost hope, incuriosity and prioritization of bodily issues into which many inmates lapsed 
                                                 
4 The difference with Rorty’s analysis of 1984 is that in 1984, the same effect was achieved by making the 
torture subject say, believe or desire something that they could not later continue living with. As we have seen 
in our discussion on Arendt, there were also choices and dilemmas in the camps which most likely had the 
capacity of tearing a mind to pieces (e.g. choices between murder and murder). 
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as a result of hard work, neglect and lasting fear. It seems that Rorty’s interpretation of the 
aim of torture in 1984 holds also in the case of the lasting terror that occurred in the Soviet 
forced labor camps and Nazi concentration and extermination camps. 
The phenomenon of the Muselmann suggests that the inmates who were the unluckiest 
and slowest in getting accustomed to the camp ways of life were in danger of becoming 
unable to tell a sensible story about themselves and the world. They fell victim to a similar 
kind of torture as that which Rorty drew our attention to: the unique humiliation that humans 
can be made to feel when their particular structures of language and belief are being forcibly 
torn down. The world of the unluckiest, the Muselmänner, became unmade in the sense that 
they lost their freedom of narrativity, that is, any hope of constituting a coherent narrative: 
we can find evidence of that in the reduction of language to a handful of body- and work-
related words and phrases that Shalamov brought to us via Kolyma Tales, in Levi’s 
description of the “non-men” who “march in silence”, “too empty to really suffer” and who 
have no fear in the face of death, as they are “too tired to understand”. As Arendt wrote, the 
victims of the death camps were reduced to beings who could not act out of their own 
spontaneity, but only react. The killing of the unique person in man meant the killing of their 
freedom of narrativity – their ability to describe and to redescribe.  
I treat the fact of having questions, general attempts to make sense of the situation one 
is in, and anticipation of the future as crucial elements of one’s personal narrative, which, 
employing a certain linguistic value system (in Rorty’s words, final vocabulary), is a 
framework that enables the understanding of the world around us – and of others with whom 
this world is shared. In this approach, Arendt’s and Rorty’s emphasis and key concepts come 
together, allowing us to sketch a tentative bridge between Arendt’s political philosophy and 
Rorty’s pragmatism.  
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3 Playfulness, spontaneity and redescription in Jaan Kross’s 
short stories  
The short stories “Halleluuja” (“Hallelujah”) (1990) and “Vürst” (“The Prince”) (1993) 
are the focus of this chapter. The stories are set in late 1940s and early 1950s. Both share the 
setting of a Soviet labor camp and are narrated by Peeter Mirk, a careful, curious, thoughtful 
and humorous observer with a lust for life. Both “Halleluuja” and “Vürst” have an eccentric 
figure in the spotlight, Dr Ulrich and Basile accordingly. 
Recalling Rorty’s distinction between the kind of books that sensitize us to the sufferings 
of others and those which help us pursue autonomy, self-perfection and aesthetic bliss (or 
illuminate the meaning and effect of this pursuit), it is clear that Kross’s works fall into the 
same category with 1984. This is because they also illuminate the sufferings that certain 
social practices and institutions can cause, instead of focusing on the “effects of our private 
idiosyncrasies on others.” (Rorty 1989, 141) However, unlike 1984, Kross’s stories about 
life in Soviet forced labor camps and under totalitarian and authoritarian regimes maintain a 
sense of hope, as the narrator of the stories Peeter Mirk (as well as Kross himself) manages 
to avoid the most difficult conditions thanks to luck and careful decisions, and often, there 
seems to be an escape (even if not hope for an actual physical survival) from the destruction 
and meaninglessness also for the most notable characters around him. As such, Kross’s 
stories are capable of highlighting some moral dilemmas that are specific to certain aspects 
of life in a totalitarian regime, instead of being depictions of hopelessness and destruction. 
The latter would leave no space for the readers to argue about the meaning of the characters’ 
moral choices, first and foremost because such choices lose their force and relevance - 
indeed, they never arise – for camp inmates who go through most extreme forms of suffering. 
Suffering and pain figure in Kross’s works in subtle ways, and come to light mainly via the 
people around Mirk whose life stories (and painful encounters with the political regime) 
form a noteworthy set of fates. As Kross’s texts contribute to making us aware of the pain 
and suffering of the people who live under totalitarian rule, subject to various forms of 
repression, deportations, arbitrary arrests, forced labor, violent interrogations, threats and 
fear, Kross’s works count as literature which helps us become less cruel, i.e. literature of 
public importance. 
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3.1 Play and the status of an “emergency rascal” in “Vürst” 
In “Vürst”, we follow the story of Basile, a colorful figure whom Mirk met in Inta. It is 
hinted that he had come into conflict with the Soviet authorities by freeing some people 
whom the German occupying forces had arrested in Poland, although the reasons for his 
arrest and punishment are never disclosed with clarity or in detail. Mirk described him at the 
first encounter in the camp as someone who has an edge of “impertinently confident 
homeliness” and “dangerous flippancy inappropriate for this place” (Kross 2004, 195).  
Yet, regardless of those first impressions, a delicate kind of solidarity develops between 
Mirk and Basile. Basile invited Mirk to a “dinner party” with some fellow inmates. Due to 
Basile’s attitude and use of language, the “party” had an air of grandeur, which, given the 
circumstances of the camp, seemed eerie and unfitting, bubbling with a kind of vitality that 
seemed out of place in the camps. Basile told his friends that met the chess world champion 
Capablanca in a train once, and Capablanca challenged him for a blind chess match. Basile 
was very proud of that fact, and the metaphor of the blind chess match also serves as an 
explanation for Basile’s behavior and (moral) choices in the camp. His comment about the 
chess match speaks of the honor of playing blind with a grand master, which distinguishes 
him from the general mass of people. 
Ha-ha-ha-haa. I had to play. Well, you can believe that the miracle didn’t happen, and he 
checkmated me on the 11th move. But I can say: I have played with the world champion. 
First. But secondly, and it is much more uncommon, since there are hundreds of those who 
have played with him. I am super-probably the only person in the world, who has played 
their first and hitherto only blind match – against the world champion! (Kross 2004, 211) 
It is difficult to avoid the parallel with Goethe’s Faust: especially when considering the 
question who might be the “world champion” against whom Basile plays the game of his 
life, in the context of the camps where there is nothing to hope for. The figure of the devil is 
present in “Vürst” both implicitly and explicitly, even if we overlook the similarities in how 
the titles of those works sound. The devil figured in Basile’s moral judgments as firmly as 
God did, but in somehow more convincing ways, perhaps because Basile associates devil 
with earthly matters and the world here and now. When speaking of a criminal who 
endangers his life in the camp, Basile said:  
I think he’s too small of a scoundrel to be something in the eyes of the world or the devil. 
Like, say, Hitler or someone else, you know who I mean. And with his eleven murders still 
too big and unstylish of a scum for the God to forgive him. As he does to little rascals, the 
emergency-rascals (Kross 2004, 237). 
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The game was not aimed for winning, as Basile did not think there is anything in the 
camp for him to hope for: “’H e r e 5 everything is clear anyway. Even much more than 
everything. So there’s nothing for me to fear here. And of course also not to hope for, 
either.’” (Kross 2004, 214) Despite that fact, Basile’s play in the camp was play with high 
stakes, just like in Faust: his extravagance and bravura were balancing between singling him 
out, earning him the tacit respect of others (at least the respect from Mirk), and getting him 
into trouble. The urgency and importance of the play seem to be connected to its existentially 
reflective and aesthetic nature, rather than any pragmatic considerations. The combination 
of hopelessness and play had a somewhat liberating effect on Basile, given the eccentric 
ways in which his performative and aesthetic ways allowed him to take the last out of the 
camp-experience.  
Even though Basile had no agreement with the devil, there was a game to be played with 
him, and not just because of vanity. The game certainly had a somewhat sinister and serious 
edge to it. This is due to the lack of hope, the determination with which Basile had set himself 
the mission of playing till the end, and the implicit indication of the presence of a Grand 
Master. The flavor of the presence of the Grand Master seems to connect to Basile’s repeated 
mentioning of the devil in different contexts. This reading of the short story could be 
illustrated with the combination of his grand, theatrical hospitality, and his role as an 
“emergency rascal”.  
The play, then, is compatible with the moral choices that Basile had made: in his youth, 
freeing the birds who were to be taken to the slaughterhouse, and later in Inta refusing to be 
subdued or stripped of his individuality, defying adjustment to the vocabulary and the ways 
of the camp, or even the act of reporting a fellow inmate Akim Akimõts to the camp 
authorities for attempting to sell a pair of pants to Mirk. Freeing the birds (during Basile’s 
student days) who were caged, tied up at a marketplace and about to be taken to their death 
was described as an act that was full of youthful passion for life, and less as a rebellion 
against the social order and the power – after all, Basile and his mates freed only the birds, 
praising them as “Christ’s flying birds”, and left the pigs alone. The deeds of Basile’s youth 
illustrated the fact that playing pranks creates confusion in a world of scripts and rules; 
similarly, his pranks in the forced labor camp created confusion in the script of camp life. 
                                                 
5 At the time when the short stories were published (1990s), expanded text was a device for emphasis in 
the typesetting.  
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Basile’s vocabulary and manners of speech embodied the kind of diversity and richness that 
were uncommon in the camps. 
“Vürst” is spiced by one particular thread of action that occurs throughout the story. It is 
a kind of mystery: the person on duty in Mirk’s bloc, Akim Akimõts, offered him (as well 
as Mirk’s friend Tammo) a pair of pants for sale. Mirk did not buy the pants, but mentioned 
the incident to Basile in passing. It later turns out that someone informed the camp authorities 
of Akim’s attempt to sell the pants; Akim was punished and suspected Mirk and Tammo, as 
they were the only people whom he had offered the pants. In the end of the story, we learn 
that it was Basile who informed the authorities.  
In the context of the forced labor camp, informing on others seems to denote a dangerous 
level of conformity, as it speaks of adjusting to the script by which the camp life runs. Basile 
seems to have internalized the redescription that the camp offers: “everyone fights for 
themselves”, “one must not get caught”. This would already bring him closer to losing 
himself to the destructive power of the camp which rendered the inmates unable to feel 
concern for their fellow men. Due to Basile’s tacit solidarity with Mirk, the choice to report 
Akim’s deed and implicate Mirk and Pallo comes over as puzzling. Certainly, this apparent 
contradiction raises questions about Basile’s motives. Did he risk causing trouble to Mirk 
and Pallo due to his conviction that one ought to act by the rule ‘everyone [fights] for 
themselves’ and “one must not get caught”, or is there an alternative explanation, which is 
perhaps even based on moral considerations? 
Interpreting Basile as seriously sticking to the rule “everyone for themselves”, i.e. as 
adopting the camp vocabulary and principles, might be correct if we had known Basile as a 
serious, non-playful character before the camp-period. As Arendt’s and Agamben’s works 
also indicate, internalizing the redescription that the camps entail was a common and indeed 
often inevitable path, unless one decides to rebel against it (like Dr Ulrich in “Halleluuja”, 
for example). Given that Basile was a prankster who had a past of committing deeds that 
disrupt the order of a given social system and violate the ‘script’ of appropriate and expected 
behavior, however, his decisions in the camp incorporate the same spirit of disruption, 
creating confusion, going for the unexpected, and tending towards playfulness. In this 
conversation between Mirk and Basile, Basile had revealed “the rules of his game”. The 
most basic rules of Basile’s game come down to evasion and self-centeredness:  
“Why, this is ridiculous. My person on duty also offered me a pair of pants a quarter an hour 
ago–“ 
“Your Akim–?”  
39 
 
“Yes. That is, if I had bought them, both of us would have gotten walking papers? He from 
the position of the person on duty, and I from the place where you put me tomorrow. We 
would have been sent to the lock-up for a week and afterwards to underground-work. But I 
would have been buying due to l a c k  o f  k n o w l e d g e  and he would have been selling 
due to h u n g e r ! ” 
“Nobody asks for motives here, mon cher. It’s just: one shouldn’t get caught–“  
(Kross 2004, 205–6) 
Basile demonstrated how playfulness can uphold the freedom of narrativity that 
totalitarian concentration and forced labor camps destroy; in this kind of playfulness, 
spontaneity is realized and redescription is employed. Spontaneity, redescription and 
playfulness are incompatible with the kind of fixed framework of action and thought that 
both Arendt and Rorty criticized. Aside from being important for survival, maintaining one’s 
freedom of narrativity enables the person to keep their ability of making moral choices intact. 
Basile’s choice to report Akim’s attempt to sell the pants (which were camp’s property) was 
not driven by the intent to harm another prisoner; it was rather a part of his resistance to the 
desolate reality of the camps. Despite announcing the rules of his game, Basile did not aim 
to maintain/achieve a (safe) position in the camp hierarchy, but to perform, to enact the 
unexpected. Instead of making the camp-script his own, Basile responded by realizing and 
enacting the unexpected, working with the possibilities that life in the camps offered. This 
response manifested in his adoption of the role of the prankster: another aspect of Basile’s 
playfulness comes to the surface if we look how aesthetically the role of an ‘emergency 
rascal’ was played out. This role tended towards bravura, as the game came with heightened 
risks to Basile’s survival – after all, he constituted a disruption in the order of the camp life, 
which was most probably also the reason why, in the end of the story, his life was endangered 
by the “main bandit” of the camp.  
His game was a meta-stance, a reflection on the rules and self-description that he was 
supposed and expected to adopt and adhere by. This playful reflection creates a distance 
from the set of rules that it reflects on – hence working with the same dialectical dynamic as 
the figures of the sceptic and the ironist whom Arendt and Rorty (respectively) praised for 
their carefulness, reflectivity, and independence of thought. For Arendt, the sceptic was the 
only morally trustworthy kind of person at times when the ‘chips go down’, since the sceptic 
was spontaneous, unbound by standards and rules in their (moral) judgment; for Rorty, the 
ironist’s practice of redescription played a key role in moral progress, and freed intellectual 
practices from the shackles of searching for objective truth (by attempting to refute 
descriptions of phenomena with the help of other old descriptions, without creating new 
ones).  
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Kross’s other stories, set in restless times of war and occupations, also highlight the 
moral and aesthetic-emotional force of play, albeit Mirk’s playfulness focuses on the play as 
a moral choice while emphasizing different aspects of it than Basile’s play. The basic rules 
from which their playfulness emerges are different. Mirk’s rules of the game go down to 
surviving and staying true to one’s core self via careful balancing between resistance and 
‘blending in’, thus serving as a witness and koondsaatus (concentrated fate/set of fates) of 
his time and its historical/political contingencies. Basile’s play, on the other hand, emerges 
from a sense of existential greatness. This makes Basile’s play almost an ode to the aesthetic 
potential of the diversity of life and its possibilities. 
The fact that Basile has undertaken the mission to play even though there is no hope to 
win seems to raise a bittersweet conflict between a sense of respect and pity for him, and 
those feelings waver in our perception of Basile’s character from the beginning to the end of 
the story. The concept of play is manifold, as “Vürst” illuminates two aspects of play which 
are relevant for understanding Basile: a play, the theatrical power and aesthetic relevance of 
which stems from being performed to someone, hence maintaining a certain distance from 
oneself and what is played, and play(ing) against a Grand Master, an imagined opponent (or 
perhaps even a comrade). From the point where Basile tells the story of his chess match with 
the world champion, we start to perceive Mirk as a spectator of the game that Basile is 
playing, a game that indeed has to be doomed – as Basile also noted himself – and yet has 
to be played.  
Mirk’s presence brought to life the possibility for Basile’s play to be played and gave 
him an audience. The theatrical aspect of Basile’s play comes to life in being presented, 
which is also supported by his generally theatrical ways of being. In the second paragraph 
of “Vürst”, Mirk associates him with the Doctor from Rolf Hochhuth’s play “Deputy”.  The 
somewhat shy, unspoken appreciation between Mirk and Basile could stem from the fact 
that Mirk was the spectator of Basile’s play, allowing him to bring certain things (like the 
beauty of unexpected and unpredictable acts of mercy, kindness, or hospitality) to the 
surface, letting them emerge, and through the aesthetics of all that, allowing Basile to resist 
the purposiveness and destructivity of the camps.  
Treating Basile’s playfulness as a moral choice raises a question about the moral 
vocabulary of “Vürst”. The moral vocabulary of Kross’s labor camp stories is not enunciated 
clearly, but emerges tacitly: in the camps, the moral framework focuses on themes of 
preservation and (moral) survival, rather than active altruism. It also becomes clear that there 
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is a boundary, expressed in the words “scoundrel” and “scum”6, beyond which one cannot 
be respected as a human being. It is a category which Mirk cannot really tolerate, in his own 
words, and for which Basile also expresses his distaste. The moral vocabulary of Basile 
himself manifests itself most clearly in the opposition that he draws between his role (as an 
emergency rascal) and the deeds of an actual criminal. In the scene where Basile described 
Kotelnikov, “the main bandit” of the camp7, who had allegedly decided to kill him, Basile’s 
words “too big and unstylish of a scum” speak of his distaste for the seriousness of 
Kotelnikov’s deeds (“too big … of a scum”), i.e. the robberies and murders, as well as for 
the lack of style (“too … unstylish of a scum”): Mirk’s brief description of Kotelnikov 
indicates that he was a simple criminal who, quite probably, was not motivated by some deep 
sense of misanthropy, nor did he give the impression of the type who has a liking for nuance 
and fine-grained elaborate play. 
Kotelnikov’s shortcoming in style was not simply an aesthetic issue, as the style is, given 
Basile’s own words and behavior, quite clearly one of the keywords that guided Basile’s 
choices. It has a value that extends beyond a reasonable concern for the beauty of the game; 
a stylish game/role is a kind of skill which seems to give the game its force. This skill is, on 
the one hand, a skill for an aesthetic and existential reflection, but on the other, it is also a 
skill for working with the unique and often limited/restricted possibilities that the situation 
offers, doing it as artfully and masterfully as possible. In Basile’s hands, it is also a skill to 
create confusion in a morally deplorable, destructive system, instead of perpetuating 
unlawfulness and moral depravity in a non-destructive system. 
 A difference between Basile’s game and a cruel game is evident: cruel and evil games 
tend to be destructive rather than constructive. To the extent that Basile’s game carries moral 
and aesthetic force in a combined fashion, it is essentially and necessarily different from a 
sadistic game which, first and foremost, rejoices in the sufferings of others. Basile’s game 
was self-constructive, as it kept him emotionally alive, his freedom of narrativity flourishing 
and intact. The moral vocabulary of “Vürst” helps us here: the categories of a scoundrel and 
a scum were clearly distinguished from and (regarding the question of possible forgiveness 
by God) opposed to the label of an emergency rascal in Basile’s vocabulary. The moral 
framework of Kross’s forced labor camp stories does not problematize this categorization; 
                                                 
6 kaabakas and mölakas in Estonian. 
7 Kotelnikov was a kind of celebrity in the camp: he had 9 train robberies and 11 murders on his account, 
which earned him the reverence of his peers. Mirk did not describe him as a particularly notable figure, but as 
rather average and inconspicuous (Kross 2004, 235). 
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while Mirk (as the narrator of several of these stories) was certainly intrigued by Basile and 
his choices, Mirk did not condemn him.  
It is also clear that while Arendt’s account of the totalitarian terror (as well as various 
more and less theoretical reflections on the same topic by intellectuals of the 20th century), 
films (e.g. “Schindler’s List”, “The Pianist”, “A Love to Hide”), and survivor accounts (Levi, 
Shalamov, etc.) equip us with examples of cruel and senseless games ‘played’ in the forced 
labor, concentration and extermination camps in the Third Reich and in Stalin’s Soviet 
Union, those games do not seem to carry the same meaning and function as Basile’s game. 
Levi, as we have seen, brought to us a graphic picture of a senseless cruel game which relies 
on the fact that fresh Auschwitz inmates had no idea what was happening to them and why 
– the greatness of the sufferings and the injustice simply did not fit into any sensible 
narrative. The futility and dangerousness of asking questions gave a sudden powerful start 
to the decline of the inmates’ freedom of narrativity, inviting a madness-like, automated state 
of existence. Instead of having a reflective/constructive edge (as Basile’s theatrically grand 
manners did, for example), these kinds of games contributed to destroying the inmates’ 
freedom of weaving coherent stories. 
3.2 Steadfastness as a form of resistance in “Halleluuja” 
The main character of the story “Halleluuja”, Dr Ulrich, is similar to Basile in many 
relevant ways, yet Mirk’s attitude towards him is very different. Mirk met Dr Ulrich in a 
coal mining camp. Dr Ulrich’s appearance and behavior inspired Mirk to note his uncommon 
ways. Dr Ulrich’s clothing and manners (which were generally not maintained or preserved 
in such a way in the camp lifestyle) gave him away as misfit. For example, the fact that 
Ulrich knocked on the door, while in the camp no one knocks on the door before entering. 
Mirk described the edge of absurdity in their meeting: “He had a … face that was bluish 
from the cold and dead serious despite the absurdity of the moment.” (Kross 2004, 97) 
Dr Ulrich’s personality started to become more illuminated as he told the story of his 
time in Berlin. He had been a historian. During the intensive bombing of Berlin, he stayed 
in the city and took care of his archive amidst the chaos. His reasoning was that he was not 
a Nazi but a historian, and he was responsible for the values that were entrusted to him.8 
                                                 
8 In Estonian, “vastutas tema hoolde usaldatud väärtuste eest”: there is an ambiguity as to what „väärtused“ 
refers to specifically, since it could be both „valuables“/“valuable objects“ and „values“ in the sense of 
principles.  
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(Kross 2004, 98) Indeed, this is an important thread in the story. The argument that Dr Ulrich 
is responsible for the values that are entrusted to him could be seen as an explanation to 
many of his acts.  
Amidst the chaos of wartime Berlin, Ulrich arranged a surprise birthday gift to his friend 
Mr Palmquist: a difficult task, given that Ulrich was determined to express his respect for 
his friend in a “more or less original way” (Kross 2004, 102). The war-ridden city left no 
possibilities for originality anymore, though: the shops that were still functioning did not 
offer a diversity of goods that would have enabled an original, personal and unique present. 
Amidst the chaotic and nervous circumstances and reduced possibilities for originality, Dr 
Ulrich figured out an idea for a present that had a taste of oddness, childlike joy of life, and 
uniqueness. At the same time, the gift was half-way a prank, not for Mr Palmquist, but 
certainly for the norms and expectations of the society of wartime Berlin. It was a car horn 
that produced the sound of HAL-LE-LU-JAH from (G. F. Händel’s “Messiah”).  
HAL-LE-LU-JAH!  
HAL-LE-LU-JAH! 
the horn was whooping, amplified by the car battery, amidst the bare trees, moonlight 
shadows, ruins and still intact walls of houses. Silvery. Clear. Triumphant. (Kross 2004, 106)  
Dr Ulrich’s quest for originality has an element of pride in it, which was noticeable in 
how he described the gift. Honking the car horn in a war-ridden city brought along the 
annoyance of other people, besides violating curfew. However, Dr Ulrich seemed to perceive 
the car horn as something quite essential and symbolic, as an act of rebellion against the 
destruction and a preservation of originality, the past values and the joy of life. Dr Ulrich’s 
stories about his war-time experiences in Berlin reveal his quest for originality, which is 
combined with a certain amount of bravery and unpracticality in his character. 
This kind of emphasis on keeping going, happily – or rather fiercely – in the dire 
circumstances, as in the camp, could be understood as an expression of Dr Ulrich’s 
responsibility to take care of the values of his era, with which he had been entrusted. 
‘Well, I slept my fill – as much as it is possible while listening for the air raid alarm through 
sleep and Hallelujah-chorus, and Palmquist as well, and from then on he drove happily 
around Berlin with his car horn. As happily as the circumstances allowed. I mean, rather 
fiercely than happily.’(Kross 2004, 108)  
In describing the car horn, Dr Ulrich used the words “fascinating” and “hooligan”: “’that 
in this tact,’ the doctor continued, ‘was hidden a praise to God, but God was a persona non 
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grata in the Greater Germany … And the main thing, fascinating and hooligan, was that the 
word behind the call of our horn – hallelujah – let us praise Jehovah, you see – was intangibly 
despicably9 in Hebrew.” (Kross 2004, 108) We could see the same elements of enacting the 
unexpected (as in Basile’s case) in his behavior in the camp, the joy and pride of taking the 
risk and not doing what one is expected to do: a prank-like despicability (sigadus) against 
the system.  
In the second part of the story, the focus shifts to Dr Ulrich’s life in the camp, and that 
part of the story is more engaged with Mirk’s perspective and opinion about Dr Ulrich. Here, 
the reader encounters the problematic sides of Dr Ulrich’s inclination for originality, 
manners, precision, and staying true to and preserving the values that he sustained before his 
arrest. Dr Ulrich did not even attempt to fit in as Mirk observed – he did not accept the set 
of rules that the inmates in the labor camps use to stay alive. “Halleluuja” concluded with 
the scene where Dr Ulrich rejected one of the survival strategies. In this scene, Mirk found 
out his attempt to get Ulrich physically un-demanding work in the kitchen during 
convalescence had resulted in failure. Namely, the head cook had been secretly watching 
how Dr Ulrich, the cook’s assistant, was cutting cheese, and to the cook’s surprise, Ulrich 
did not eat even one piece of cheese in the process. This was in such a stark contrast with 
expected behavior in the camp – food theft for survival – that the cook fired Dr Ulrich 
immediately, freeing the kitchen job for people who might benefit from the opportunity of 
having some extra snacks during their work. 
Mirk pointed out that although the inconveniences that followed from Dr Ulrich’s 
rigorous reluctance to adjust brought him closer to physical perishing with each passing day, 
his mental energy only seemed to grow. It is evident that Dr Ulrich’s extravagance of moral 
firmness, excessive precision and reluctance to adjust to the morals of the camp served the 
purpose of moral survival for Ulrich, if not physical: it could be seen as a kind of resistance 
against the “moral strangulation” (Kross 2004, 108) of his time, carrying an element of doom 
and joyful bravery at the same time. This reading is supported by the increase of mental 
energy in Dr Ulrich that Mirk observed:  
… it seemed to me that his knees were shaking every time from the weakness that was 
threatening to overwhelm him. At the same time, his mental energy seemed to rather 
increase. His anecdotes seemed only more polished. His personal stories included only more 
surprising punch lines. (Kross 2004, 110) 
                                                 
9 “sigaduslikult” in Estonian. 
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Indeed, there is innocent, almost child-like playfulness present in Ulrich’s stories, imitations 
and theatricalities. In the light of the senselessness of the sufferings and difficult circumstances 
in which the inmates of the German and Soviet camps found themselves, and the decline in their 
ability to act and be spontaneous as their physical situation deteriorates, Rorty’s interpretation 
of Orwell’s message in 1984 is relevant for us also at this point of the discussion. With Orwell, 
Rorty found confirmation to his point about the contingency of community: the idea that future 
is up for grabs, that O’Briens are possible, and there is nothing in the nature of man, truth, or 
language that would prevent the rise of social institutions and practices which subdue the 
individuals, mold them into an unthinking mass, and cause pain and humiliation.  
In this context, Rorty interpreted Winston’s steadfastness in holding the belief “two plus two 
makes four” as a form of resistance, and saw Orwell’s project as useful advice for when the chips 
go down: “So I read the passage from Winston’s diary about the need to insist that two and two 
equals four not as Orwell’s view about how to keep the O’Briens at bay but, rather, as a 
description of how to keep ourselves going when things get tight.” (Rorty 1989, 185) In our 
interpretation, insisting that two plus two makes four was a way for Winston to remain connected 
to himself and to maintain a coherent narrative amidst a society where talking to fellow people 
(in the sense of having an educated, free discussion) does not make sense anymore. The same 
theme, “how to keep ourselves going when things get tight” is important for understanding Dr 
Ulrich. His steadfastness about his values enabled him to keep going in the camp, and was 
essential for his emotional and moral survival, although it increasingly destroyed his chances for 
actual physical survival day by day. However, his freedom of narrativity remained intact, and 
his death which must have followed soon thereafter, could not have been the vanishing of a 
Muselmann.  
Dying with dignity, having remained capable of resistance (and hence also spontaneous) 
through joyful (or rather, fierce) playfulness constitutes an act of standing up against the aim of 
the camps (to subdue and break the individuality and freedom of narrativity of the prisoners), 
even if it has no hope for physical survival. This choice is contrasted with Peeter Mirk’s 
pragmatist choice to play along the rules in the camp (while deciding to internally never blend 
in), and keep himself going like this. Arendt’s works have provided us with thorough analyses 
of the “achievements” of the camps: anonymous deaths that are stripped of meaning and 
remembrance, and the killing of the unique person in man. Dr Ulrich resisted those prospects via 
his choice of vocabulary and via redescription of the place he was at, as well as his role in it – in 
this aspect, his choice was similar to that of Basile’s. Basile also rejected the redescription of 
himself that the camp offered, which we could roughly phrase like this: ‘you are on the lowest 
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level of society, and your first and primary concern is to take care of your physical needs in this 
hopeless situation, if you want to survive as long as possible.’ 
Hence, it seems that Dr Ulrich’s choice to reject the survival strategies and guard his values 
is a fully serious one; naivete and steadfastness seem to dominate in his behavior at the first 
glance. However, his stories about his life in Berlin (especially the surprise birthday present for 
his friend Mr Palmquist) create some dissonance in this impression, as well as Mirk’s occasional 
remarks that there is an edge of daring bravery present in Dr Ulrich. Ulrich’s search for 
originality was compatible with dignified pranks that would realize the joy of life. The joy of 
life (even if realized with effort, through “clenched teeth”), bravery, and the dignity of a man 
and his values must remain – this seems to be the motivating force from which Dr Ulrich’s 
steadfastness emerged. Dr Ulrich described an emotionally powerful scene: he was being 
transported inside the ‘Black Raven’10 in Berlin by the Russians, and in the traffic of the war-
ridden city, he heard the sound of Mr Palmquist’s horn, “HAL-LE-LUU-JA!”. Dr. Ulrich said: 
“ [It sounded] three times. Not more. But not less either. Well, I do not have to explain to you 
how I felt right then.” (Kross 2004, 113) Dr Ulrich’s reaction to this incident could be interpreted 
as carrying the same sense of triumph and joy of keeping going, fiercely and originally, amidst 
chaos. The end result for Dr Ulrich was a play with risks, which, unlike Basile’s play, did not 
have the performative aspect, but which risked with the “player’s” survival just the same. 
Ulrich’s play also did not have an edge of bravura, unlike Basile’s.  
Ulrich’s dignified maintenance of his values was linked with dog-like11 behavior in 
“Halleluuja”: Dr Ulrich himself expresses surprise over how dog-like his moral choices are. 
Imagining the possibility of a traffic accident having happened with the car in which he was 
transported after the arrest, Dr Ulrich mused, “… if such an accident would happen, I should 
remain standing by the black raven, and call out for help – And that would be more than 
dog-like, but the only right thing to do.” (Kross 2004, 113) Despite expressions like “the 
only right thing to do”, which might refer to some fixed moral framework, Dr Ulrich’s 
firmness is not a sign of him operating with a fixed set of values in Arendt’s sense, which he 
would generally employ in the situation he encounters (although the incompatibility between 
his values and the situations he was in was very strong). We could say that he stayed true to 
his belief that there are values to be guarded for him, and refused to adopt the camp-
redescription, the way in which one was supposed to see life in the camps.12 The camp-
redescription, which both Basile and Dr Ulrich avoided, is a power tool. Its end result – a 
                                                 
10 “Black raven” was the colloquial name for the car in which prisoners were transported. 
11 “Koeralik” in Estonian. 
12 We have introduced the term, “camp-redescription”, in section 1.2.  
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person who is not really living, not really dead – lacks freedom of narrativity, as the person 
ceases to form stories of themselves and others, hence also stopping to hope, fear, and 
contemplate. 
There is a clear difference between how the characters are perceived: Basile invites 
respect (partly also due to his special relationship with Mirk), while Dr Ulrich evokes mostly 
pity. Their moral choices employ redescription in ways which address the possibilities and 
hope that remain in the worst of conditions on a larger scale, even if they themselves did not 
have much to hope for: they both avoided the silent vanishing of anonymous, subdued, 
automated inmates whose death is not really a death and not really their own. As the camp 
experience was a rupture of everyday habits and lifestyle, playfulness cannot really be seen 
as a habit. Even if the person has a habit of playing, the circumstances in the camp were very 
particular and different from every-day life, and the play makes it possible for novelty and 
uniqueness to arise. The artistic side of the decision to play – the presence of theatricality 
and spectator(s), for example – comes with a sense of profundity that starts to flavor the 
character’s choices for the reader. Playfulness – playing with the devil, enacting the 
unexpected, spicing one’s theatricality with bravura, as well as playing with the risks and 
possibilities in search of originality, is something that requires courage, individuality, and 
improvisation, therefore entailing an artistic and spontaneous element, which the camps were 
designed to break. Denying the redescription of the camps, not adopting the new manners 
and ways of life, also speaks of resistance, although the resistance did not include 
playfulness. Playfulness and survival, seemingly contradictory concepts, are interwoven in 
intricate ways in Kross’s works. 
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Conclusion 
Jaan Kross’s works use rich language, presenting curious, humorous, and complex 
characters, and depict the moral dilemmas that arose amidst World War II and the totalitarian 
repressions of the mid-20th century. As we have seen, the (possibility of) ‘moral 
strangulation’ of the people who lived in dangerous times and experienced painful 
encounters with a repressive state apparatus, lingers in the camp settings that Kross presented 
in “Vürst” and “Halleluuja”. Interestingly, despite such hopelessness, the reader gets a sense 
of the strong freedom of narrativity in the characters at the same time – a sense of their 
survival regardless of swiftly approaching death. This sense of survival might, at the first 
glance, seem odd and unrealistic when compared to the complete destruction of a human 
being that Arendt wrote about, or the unmade worlds of Winston and Julia in 1984, analyzed 
and brought to us by Rorty.  
In this thesis, we have presented a framework for elaborating on this combination of 
physical hopelessness and moral force and giving meaning to it. This framework has the 
concept of playfulness at its center, and employs the idea of the freedom of narrativity (which 
emerged from our synthesis of Rorty and Arendt) in highlighting the importance of that kind 
of playfulness. Both Arendt and Rorty addressed the issue of senselessness/meaninglessness 
with regard to the destructive power of torture and totalitarian terror. Arendt and Rorty saw 
the terror and torture as eliminating two phenomena that are essential for our (emotional) 
survival: spontaneity and freedom to redescribe, respectively. Hence, besides a language-
related practice like redescription, spontaneity also plays a role in maintaining one’s freedom 
of narrativity as a more general ability to begin something new. Playfulness, in the way in 
which it emerges in Basile and Dr Ulrich’s case, helps one maintain those capacities and 
freedoms. We have also shown how in the context of a forced labor camp playfulness can 
have a strong moral and aesthetic force, and the ‘game’ – with its rules clearly spelled out – 
can on a more abstract level serve as a kind of aesthetic/existential nonverbal reflection on 
one’s situation, due to its distance from the seriousness of life and the situation in which the 
player finds himself. 
This playfulness cannot emerge in extremely difficult conditions where people are 
quickly rendered unable to redescribe and where spontaneity is swiftly and successfully 
eliminated, however. In the first parts of the thesis, we have dwelled on such conditions at 
length, introducing the stages of destruction that Arendt outlined, and the seriousness of the 
situation where a person’s world has been unmade and they are unable to weave a coherent 
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story about themselves again. Those processes of destruction are important to keep in mind 
as a horizon – a possibility that loomed also in the forced labor camps and of which Kross 
and the main characters of his works were aware. The possibility of destruction allows us to 
see the (moral and existential, dignity-related) urgency of the kind of playfulness we 
describe, and highlights playfulness clearly as a form of resistance.  
Besides the playfulness which manifests itself in performative theatricality, the figure of 
a prankster, and unexpected behavior, there is also the playfulness of Dr Ulrich that emerges 
from the combination of moral steadfastness, a daring attitude of bravery that plays with 
risks, and a quest for originality. It is a subtler kind of play, which looks like the opposite of 
playfulness on the first glance: Dr Ulrich’s faithfulness to his moral principles is very 
dominant in the story, and the playfulness comes out in nuanced ways, not spelled out as 
clearly as in Basile’s case. However, Dr Ulrich’s quest for originality as a fueling aspect to 
his moral steadfastness enables him to keep himself going, without adopting the vocabulary 
of the camp.  
With this analysis, we have started a conversation between Arendt’s and Rorty’s ideas. 
Through outlining the role of redescription in playfulness, it has become clear that Rorty’s 
concepts and ideas are useful for analyzing and interpreting the larger socio-political 
processes (loss of meaning, rise of senselessness), moral dilemmas (situations from which 
there is no escape, like Winston’s situation in Room 101), and dialectical changes (shifting 
categories, blurred distinctions and reduced vocabulary) that totalitarian systems entail. The 
relevance of the thesis for the society and general public lies in the subject matter, as well as 
the way the thesis is built up. To avoid the devaluation of the term “totalitarian” (which, in 
the face of populist politics, is used quite often), it is important to have knowledge about the 
social and political dynamics and processes that come with totalitarianism. Arendt is a 
classic choice for such a task, as she has described and analyzed such processes in depth, 
which is why the thesis discusses her analyses.  
All in all, the thesis serves as a redescription of ways in which we can keep ourselves 
going in a situation as difficult, potentially destructive, and complex as life in a forced labor 
camp. However, the subject matter itself also reminds us of the fragility of human lives, and 
the power of bureaucratic organization when it is combined with isolation, violence, and 
banality of evil; this is knowledge that is worth preserving and deepening in a free, liberal 
society. Besides the description of playfulness that this work offers (which is the core of the 
project), this thesis also handles the question about the specific conditions that invite and 
cause the dilemmas and choices that Kross’s characters face.  
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Abstract 
Countering destruction with spontaneity, redescription, and playfulness:  
A philosophical reading of Kross 
 
This thesis focuses on a philosophical analysis of literature. The central question is: 
when making moral choices in a forced labor camp, what options remain? Hannah Arendt 
has written about the forced labor, concentration and extermination camps as the central 
institutions of totalitarianism, where the project of complete destruction of unwanted human 
beings is carried out; the end result is the removal of spontaneity and uniqueness in people. 
We join Arendt’s insights with those of Richard Rorty who employed the concept of 
unmaking a person’s world in his discussion of Orwell’s 1984. A synthesis of their ideas 
highlights the importance of language and the freedom of narrativity for countering the 
elimination of spontaneity (Rorty emphasized the importance of redescription). Chapter 3 
uses this synthesis for analyzing the Gulag stories of an Estonian writer, Jaan Kross. Our 
reading of the stories “Vürst” and “Halleluuja” outlines the concept of playfulness which 
employs independent redescription of the characters themselves and the situation, and 
upholds the inmates’ freedom of narrativity and spontaneity. This playfulness emerges in 
theatricality, bravura, distance from the situation and its script (the distance-keeping has a 
notable parallel to Rorty’s concept of irony), enacting the unexpected, and playing with risks 
and possibilities.  
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Resümee 
Hävitusele spontaansuse, ümberkirjelduse ja mänglevusega vastates:  
Filosoofiline tõlgendus Krossi töödest 
 
Antud magistritöö keskmes on kirjanduse filosoofiline analüüs. Keskne küsimus 
puudutab raskete valikute ees seismist totalitarismi kontekstis: seistes silmitsi 
moraalivalikutega sunnitöölaagris, millised on valikuvõimalused? Mida tähendab laagris 
teatud moraalivaliku langetamine (nii füüsilise kui moraalse) ellujäämise ning vastupanu 
osutamise perspektiivist? Hannah Arendti käsitluses on sunnitöö-, koondus- ja surmalaagrid 
totalitarismi kesksed institutsioonid, kus teostatakse soovimatute inimolendite täieliku 
hävituse projekti; lõpptulemuseks on inimeste spontaansuse ning unikaalsuse kaotamine. 
Selles töös toome Arendti sissevaated kokku Richard Rorty ideedega, kes rakendas Orwelli 
1984 analüüsis inimese maailma koostvõtmise ideed. Arendti ja Rorty ideede süntees toob 
esile keele ning narratiivse vabaduse olulisuse võitluses spontaansuse kadumise vastu. Töö 
kolmas peatükk kasutab narratiivsele vabadusele seatud rõhuasetust Eesti kirjaniku Jaan 
Krossi GULAGi-lugude tõlgendamiseks. Töö pakub tõlgendust novellidest “Vürst” ja 
“Halleluuja”, tuues esile idee mänglevusest, mis kirjeldab iseseisvalt ümber nii tegelase enda 
kui ka ümbritseva situatsiooni ning hoiab alal vangide narratiivset vabadust ja spontaansust. 
Selline mänglevus tõuseb esile teatraalsetes viisides, bravuuris, teatavas distantsis 
situatsioonist ning selle ‘skriptist’ (säärasel distantsil on märgatavaid sarnasusi Rorty 
ironismiga), ootamatuste väljamängimises ning rõhutamises ning riskide ning võimalustega 
mängimises. 
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